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The ever-increasing speed of information systems allows decision-makers around 
the world to gather, process, and disseminate information almost instantaneously. 
However, with this benefit there comes a price. Information is valuable and therefore a 
target to those who do not have it or wish to destroy it. The Internet has allowed 
information to flow freely, but it has also made information vulnerable to many forms of 
corruption. The U. S. military controls much of the world's most sensitive information, 
and since it cannot sacrifice losing the speed at which this information is currently 
processed and disseminated, it must find a way to assure its protection. There has been 
some effort to model information assurance in recent years, however the no accepted 
quantifiable model currently exists. 
This study presents a strategy to aid organizations, specifically organizations 
within the Department of Defense (DoD), in their efforts to protect valuable information 
and information systems. The model is reviewed and results from an actual analysis are 
presented. 
xiv 
MODELING INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
/. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Like many great technological advances, the unprecedented growth of the Internet 
has spawned new businesses, opportunities, ideas, and unfortunately, new problems. The 
Internet created a global community that knows no geographic boundaries; the ability to 
send and receive information freely and instantaneously has radically and permanently 
changed the speed at which the world operates. Decision-makers can now gather, 
process, and distribute information virtually instantaneously. This decision making 
process is used worldwide in endeavors ranging from small family businesses to national 
governments and transnational organizations. However, this free flow of information 
across communication networks also produces a major vulnerability inherent to the 
Internet. No nation or group is more exposed than the United States and its military. 
Although the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) was responsible for creating the 
predecessor to today's Internet, it was not originally designed to transfer information 
critical to U. S. national security, nor was it built for access by untrustworthy users. This 
thesis proposes a strategy to aid organizations, specifically organizations within the 
Department of Defense, in their efforts to protect valuable information and information 
systems. 
The beginnings of the Internet trace back to the late 1950's when then President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower formed the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in 
response to the Soviet satellite launching of Sputnik [Gromov, 2000]. In 1962, ARPA 
researcher Dr. J. C. R. Licklider was chosen to head the Information Processing 
Techniques Office, a division focused solely on developing and improving the military's 
computer technology [Zakon, 2000]. Work soon began on ARPANET, a computer 
network designed to facilitate communication between several universities involved in 
the project. ARPANET was finally operational in September of 1969 when researchers 
of the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) successfully, although briefly, 
logged into Stanford Research Institute (SRI) computers [Gromov, 2000]. 
ARPANET and other computer communication networks like it continued to 
evolve throughout the 1970's and early 1980's. In 1982, DARPA, (formerly ARPA, 
renamed the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in 1972) in cooperation with 
the Defense Communications Agency (DCA, now the Defense Information Systems 
Agency, DISA), established the first Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol 
(TCP / IP) connection. This event is officially recognized as the beginning of the Internet 
as it is known today [Zakon, 2000]. 
Security problems began almost immediately after the creation of the Internet. 
Within two years, the Internet was experiencing 1,000 host breaks a year; by 1987 this 
number had grown to 10,000 [Zakon, 2000]. The Internet, built from ARPANET'S 
policy of openness and flexibility, was simply not designed for the security necessary to 
perform commercial and governmental demands [Longstaff, Ellis, Hernan, Lipson, 
McMillan, Pesante, and Simmel, 1997]. A new vulnerability in the United States and its 
military had been exposed. 
The U. S. military must make rapid, informed decisions in order to remain the 
strongest force in the world. Networked computer systems that can gather, process, and 
disseminate information quickly in order to "serve the Department of Defense's local, 
national, and worldwide information needs" are necessary to accomplish this task [AFDD 
2-5,1998: 4]. Interrupting, destroying, or otherwise corrupting this information causes 
the decision making process to slow, which in turn reduces the ability of the military to 
defend the country and creates an opportunity for valuable information to be corrupted, 
lost, or stolen. The advent of computers and the Internet has created a new type of 
warfare where information, information systems, and information processes, rather than 
weapons or structures, are the targets. The results of a successful attack on a sensitive 
government system could be devastating to national security. 
Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1: Air Force Basic Doctrine (September, 
1997), the fundamental doctrine document for the U. S. Air Force, states that 
Warfare is normally associated with the different mediums of land, sea, 
air, and space. In addition, information is now considered another 
medium in which some aspects of warfare can be conducted [AFDD 1, 
1991:7]. 
The United States is more vulnerable to an information attack than any other nation due 
to an array of political and military factors. The U. S. is the only true superpower that 
exists today, making it a natural target for countries that wish to overtake that role or who 
simply want to do harm. However, few countries, if any, will realistically want to face 
the United States in a classic war. A well-planned information attack against the U. S. 
may mitigate some of the nation's battlefield advantage, if even temporarily, making the 
United States vulnerable to other conventional and unconventional attacks. The 
asymmetric nature of an information attack, coupled with its stealth capabilities, make it 
an ideal weapon for a nation state, national group, or transnational organization to use 
against a military superpower. 
Unlike a traditional attack, a potentially crippling information attack can come 
from anyone at any time. If executed correctly, a single person could launch an 
information attack powerful enough to severely cripple many sectors of the American 
infrastructure. A small team of people could do even more damage in a shorter amount 
of time. Often an attack may not even be detected until it is well in progress or 
completed; this makes even determining who is attacking quite difficult. Information 
itself can also be a target; classified material concerning U. S. war plans, technology, and 
even personnel can provide the enemy with critical information that could compromise 
national safety. 
No system in operational use will ever be completely safe from attack; however, 
the more that is known about an organization's system vulnerabilities, the better prepared 
that organization will be should an attack come. If system vulnerabilities can be 
identified before an enemy is able to exploit them, then the necessary steps to mitigate 
these problems can be taken. The goal of this study is, therefore, to develop a model to 
measure the level of information assurance (IA) for a DoD organization's information 
system. Joint Doctrine defines information assurance as: 
Information Operations (10) that protect and defend information systems 
(IS) by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, 
and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information 
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities 
[JP 3-13, 1998:1-9]. 
The difficulty in increasing IA lies in the balance between the level of IA and its 
impact on system operational capability and resource costs [Hamill, 2000: 4-1]. 
Whenever system IA is increased, the operational capability for that system is potentially 
impacted. Increasing IA to a maximum attainable level, which would secure the system 
but render it operationally useless, would be no better (and perhaps worse) than not 
securing it all. The solution to assuring a system is finding a balance between the level of 
IA and its impact on system operational capability that falls somewhere between the 
extremes of making a system so secure that it becomes ineffective, or so insecure that it 
becomes an easy target. Since different systems contain different information, where the 
balance point falls between these extremes will depend on the system itself. 
In addition to impacting system operational capability, every IA strategy 
consumes a certain amount of the organization's resources. A resource cost is defined to 
be any cost associated with implementing an IA strategy, whether it is a fiscal cost or a 
personnel cost. An information assurance strategy that greatly improves IA and system 
operational capability that is too expensive will not be implemented, and is consequently 
not helpful to the organization. Therefore, in order to obtain a true IA measure, the level 
of IA gained by a strategy, the potential impact the strategy will have on system 
operational capability, and cost of such an implementation must all be considered. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Every military and civilian organization is susceptible to information attacks in a 
variety of forms. It is therefore necessary to develop a methodology for measuring how 
assured an organization is against an information compromise, and to provide that 
organization with insight as to how they can improve their level of assurance. However, 
resource costs and system operational capability may be impacted whenever an assurance 
strategy is implemented and therefore must also be considered in the model. 
This thesis utilized three separate hierarchical models that measure the total level 
of information assurance as a tradeoff between IA, the change in system operational 
capability incurred by the IA strategy, and the resource cost of implementing the strategy. 
The models and their associated measures then aid in identifying what information 
assurance strategies, if any, would be most beneficial. 
1.3 Information System under Study 
Several Air Force organizations were contacted regarding participation in this 
study. After reviewing a range of systems, the kind offer of the Air Force Technical 
Applications Center (AFTAC) was accepted. AFTAC, located at Patrick AFB, FL, 
agreed to undertake this 'challenge' and volunteered their AFTAC Mission Information 
System (AMIS) to be studied. The sole criterion for selecting a system was that it 
contain valuable information the organization needed to protect. AMIS satisfied this 
condition as it is classified a SECRET system. AFTAC personnel served as the system's 
experts to help create value hierarchies, single dimensional measure functions, and score 
their system and a set of possible IA options. Their willingness to take on this extra duty 
is greatly appreciated. This project could not have been completed without their 
dedicated efforts. 
1.4 Importance of Project 
The number of computer security incidents has been steadily increasing over the 
past decade. As the Internet grows, so does the likelihood of an unauthorized system 
penetration. In December 1988, DARPA (the same organization responsible for building 
the ARPANET and then the Internet, detailed above) formed the Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) in reaction to an Internet virus known as the "Morris Worm," 
which brought down nearly 10% of the entire Internet at the time [CERT/CC, 2000]. 
Since 1988, the team has evolved into the CERT Coordination Center and is responsible 
for reporting major security incidents over the Internet. Figure 1-1, taken from data on 
the CERT Web site, shows the number of incidents identified snA subsequently reported 
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Figure 1-1: CERT Statistics on Incidents per Year [CERT/CC, 2001]. 
This chart represents only the incidents actually reported to CERT, which 
suggests that there may be thousands more incidents that go either undetected or 
unreported. Any one of the thousands of incidents portrayed above has the potential to 
do severe damage to the U. S. military, U. S. national infrastructure, or private business. 
Notice that of the 47,708 total incidents reported to CERT from 1988-2000,21,756 
(approximately 45.6%) occurred in year 2000 alone. If the number of incidents continues 
to rise at this rate, a disaster is inevitable. Information assurance is the first step in 
preventing such a disaster. 
The Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT), established in 
1992, is the AF equivalent to CERT. The mission of AFCERT is to "conduct operations 
involving intrusion detection, incident response, computer security information 
assistance, and vulnerability assessment of Air Force automated information systems" 
[AFCERT, 2001]. AFCERT also records information detailing the number of system 
incidents reported by Air Force organizations. Figure 1-2 is an inverted pyramid chart 
showing incident classifications for the year 1999: 
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Figure 1-2: 1999 AFCERT Analysis 
Approximately 368 million events out of some 5 to 7 billion events were classified as 
suspicious connections. Each of these suspicious connections had to be analyzed, and 
further action was taken on those that necessitated it. Buried in the 368 million 
suspicious connections were 71 incidents that AFCERT determined to be of malicious 
intent to the Air Force. While five of these incidents proved to be false positives, any one 
of the remaining 66 incidents had the potential to severely damage U. S. national 
security. 
Currently there are very few available methods that would allow organizations to 
measure the level of IA in a given system. While all organizations strive to protect their 
resources as best they can, there is no universally accepted way to quantitatively 
determine exactly what level of assurance they have, nor what new IA technologies will 
best help them improve their assurance level. This thesis presents an organization with a 
specific model that provides valuable insight as to the best way to improve their 
information assurance and at what cost. 
1.5 Research Approach 
As previously mentioned, the problem has three objectives: measure and 
potentially increase the level of IA at AFTAC while accounting for the impact of the IA 
strategy on system operational capability and resource costs. Since each organization 
will value IA, resource costs, and system operational capability differently, one universal 
best-case solution for this problem may not be desirable. Depending on how 
organizations value each of the objectives, it is very possible that ten organizations can 
have ten different solutions, all equally valid for their specific mission objectives. The 
project is therefore tailored to AFTAC's AMIS system using an approach known as 
Value Focused Thinking (VFT). However, application of the basic model and 
methodology to other organizations and systems is possible and encouraged. 
VFT focuses on the values of the decision-maker rather than a proposed set of 
alternatives. A value hierarchy is created to represent what the decision-maker feels is 
important to the project. A measure is developed to represent each value; these values 
are then weighted by the decision-maker based upon the range of the measure. It is this 
weighting process that allows a general model to be tailored to a specific commander or 
organization. Different alternatives, including the current state of the system, are then 
scored and ranked, producing a measure of best alternatives derived directly from the 
decision-maker's values. 
1.6 Thesis Overview and Format 
A literature review of military information assurance doctrine, computer security 
in the public sector, past attempts at modeling I A, and a review of VFT theory will follow 
in Chapter 2. A description of the methodology used to accomplish the research in this 
study and the creation of the value hierarchies will be detailed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
presents the results of the analysis, including strategy rankings based on the decision- 
maker's value weights. A sensitivity analysis on the hierarchy weights is also presented 
in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 will be a discussion on the conclusions drawn from the 
study and potential opportunities for future work. The Appendix is a detailed summary 
of the values within the hierarchy and their associated measure functions developed in 
cooperation with AFTAC and the selected information system. 
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter focuses on previous work in the field of Information Assurance (IA) 
and Value Focused Thinking (VFT). A review of Department of Defense (DoD) doctrine 
and civilian industry standards provides the scope needed to show the importance of IA 
in today's environment and to provide the foundation for the models developed. The 
doctrine review is followed by a detailed discussion of Value Focused Thinking, which 
will provide the framework used to attack the problem of modeling information 
assurance. Finally, past and present work on IA models will be presented in order to gain 
fundamental insight on modeling techniques that have been successful. 
2.1 Department of Defense Doctrine 
To effectively measure information assurance in military organizations it is 
essential that the elements of IA the DoD feels are important be correctly captured within 
the model. Therefore published DoD doctrine, which is the official position of the U. S. 
Government, was used as expert sources. 
Information operations have become one of the most important issues in defense 
doctrine. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5: Information Operations states that 
"dominating the information spectrum is as critical to conflict now as controlling air and 
space, or occupying land was in the past, and is viewed as an indispensable and 
synergistic component of aerospace power" [AFDD 2-5,1998: 5]. 
While doctrine on IA does exist, it is still a relatively new and developing field. 
There are several ways IA is defined, however the definition given in Chapter 1 from 
11 
Joint Publication 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations will be the definition 
used throughout the study: 
Information assurance is defined as Information Operations (10) that 
protect and defend information systems by ensuring their availability, 
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes 
providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating 
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities [JP 3-13,1998:1-9]. 
The terms availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation are 
considered objectives of information assurance and are defined by JP 3-13 in the context 
ofIA in Table 2-1: 
Table 2-1: Definitions of Information Assurance Objectives [JP 3-13 1998: III-3] 
Definitions of IA Objectives 
Availability Assured access by authorized users 
Integrity Protection from unauthorized change 
Authentication Verification of the originator 
Confidentiality Protection from unauthorized disclosure 
Non-Repudiation Undeniable proof of participation 
Information Operations is a broad term defined by Joint Doctrine as follows: 
actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems 
while defending one's own information and information systems. 10 
apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, 
and at every level of war [JP 3-13,1998:1-1]. 
Information assurance therefore is a subcategory of information operations; specifically, 
IA covers the defensive realm of information operations. Figure 2-1, taken from JP 3-13, 
illustrates the role of information assurance in the information operations spectrum: 
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Information Operations 
Relationships Across the Peace-Conflict Cycle 
Peace -► Crisis Conflict -► Return to Peace 
Figure 2-1: Information Operations Spectrum [JP 3-13, 1998:1-4] 
Figure 2-1 shows IA as a continuous process; it covers the entire range of 
information operations from peacetime through a major conflict and back to peace. The 
U. S. cannot afford to focus on the importance of IA only when a conflict arises; it 
demands strict vigilance at all times. The U. S. is continuously vulnerable to an 
information attack and therefore must always protect against one. An IA model must 
capture all the elements of doctrine discussed above in a quantifiable manner so it can 
determine if the organization under study meets these requirements, and if they do not 
meet them, where they are most vulnerable. The model must also show the protection, 
detection, and reaction capabilities of the organization under study. 
Information assurance is therefore the continual process of system management 
whereby: 
1) Authorized users can access the system 
2) Unauthorized users cannot access the system 
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3) Information is not lost, stolen, or corrupted 
4) Users and transmissions can be monitored 
5) Intrusions can be detected 
6) Actions can be taken during and after an intrusion 
The above list is not meant to be an all-inclusive representation of information assurance, 
but rather a starting point given by DoD doctrine that all organizations must adhere. 
2.2 Protection, Detection, Reaction 
Protection is the first line of defense in any system; if the enemy cannot penetrate 
the system then information cannot be compromised. However, in order to protect 
systems appropriately, detailed knowledge of the threats to the system must first be 
obtained. Acquiring such knowledge is no easy task in today's volatile social and 
political environment. A collection of potential threats that include terrorist groups, 
computer hackers, and foreign nations are all equally capable of launching an information 
attack. Speaking in terms of firepower alone, the United States military is perhaps the 
strongest force the world has ever seen, yet it is more vulnerable now then ever to an 
information operations attack. Information warfare is a potential "Achilles' heel' of the 
United States [which] can be the great equalizer for a militarily inferior adversary" 
[AFDD 2-5,1998:6]. 
The threat of an electronic attack against the United States is mainly due to the 
free flow of information allowed by the Internet. Since almost anyone can gain access to 
the Internet, the list of potential attackers is virtually limitless. Defending against all 
these threats requires what the DoD calls information superiority, defined as "the 
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capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while 
exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same" [JP 3-13,1998:1-10]. Air 
Force doctrine also provides an alternate definition for information superiority: "that 
degree of dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability 
to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition" [AFDD 
2-5,1998: 42]. Information superiority gives the U. S. the ability to control information 
even on an insecure network such as the Internet. Since information superiority cannot 
be obtained and maintained without information assurance, to control the information 
operations (10) spectrum, the U. S. military must have the ability to protect its own 
information, detect any unauthorized intrusions, and react to those intrusions in a timely 
fashion. 
Information assurance is contained under the Defensive Counterinformation 
(DCI) subcategory of the Information Superiority hierarchy, shown as Figure 2-2. The 
chart shows that defensive counterinformation and offensive counterinformation (OCI) 
are interrelated, indicating that offensive 10 techniques must be used to gather 
information from enemies while at the same time defending friendly information from 
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Figure 2-2: Air Force Information Superiority Construct [AFDD 2-5, 1998: 3] 
Offensive counterinformation is defined to be: 
Actions taken to control the information environment. OCI operations 
are designed to limit, degrade, disrupt, or destroy adversary information 
capabilities and are dependent on having an understanding of an 
adversary's information capabilities [AFDD 2-5,1998: 10]. 
Similarly, Air Force doctrine defines defensive counterinformation as: 
Actions that protect information, information systems, and information 
operations from any potential adversary. DCI includes such programs as 
operations security (OPSEC), information assurance, and 
counterintelligence [AFDD 2-5,1998: 10]. 
Information superiority requires that both OCI and DCI be performed equally well in 
order to control the information environment; failure to do so will prevent the U. S. 
military from controlling the information operations spectrum. 
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2.3 INFOCON Levels 
The threat of information warfare prompted the DoD to implement the 
Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) system. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) Memo CM-510-00 describes INFOCON as: 
A comprehensive defense posture and response based on the status of 
information systems, military operations, and intelligence assessments of 
adversary capabilities and intent. The INFOCON system presents a 
structured, coordinated approach to defend against a computer network 
attack and measures the focus on computer network-based protective 
measures. Each level reflects a defensive posture based on the risk of 
impact to military operations through the intentional disruption of friendly 
information systems [CJCS Memorandum CM-510-00,1999]. 
Table 2-2 outlines the INFOCON levels as reported by AFTAC: 
Table 2-2: INFOCON Levels 
INFOCON Level Threat Assessment 
INFOCON 
ALPHA 
Indications and warnings of a general threat resulting from a 
possible regional event, system probe, or planned exercise 
INFOCON 
BRAVO 
Indications that specific system being targeted, detection of 
significant and concentrated network reconnaissance, or network 
penetration resulting in no impact on DoD operations. 
INFOCON 
CHARLIE 
Limited impact attacks detected or imminent, although attacks 




General attack implying impact on DoD operations, loss in 
system functionality, and significant risk of mission failure 
[AFTAC, 2001]. 
U. S. military doctrine clearly shows the importance of IA and the role it will play 
in the emerging information era. The capability to physically attack the United States is 
limited; however the potential damage that can result from an information attack makes 
U. S. information, information systems, and information processes prime targets. It is 
easy to see that a compromise of sensitive U. S. information or data could lead to military 
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disasters. Similarly, an attack on U. S. nationwide critical infrastructures could be of 
equal or greater consequence. 
2.4 Critical Infrastructure Assurance 
Computers and technology have become so integrated in society that their 
services are taken for granted. All key infrastructures in the United States are now 
automated to some degree, making life move faster and somewhat easier for everyone. 
However, the ability of technology to provide Americans with an easier life has also 
created a major vulnerability. An information failure on a critical infrastructure system, 
due to natural causes or malicious attack, could cripple the country. This criticality is so 
important that in July of 1996 then President Clinton signed Executive Order 13010 
establishing the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), 
which was tasked with "developing a comprehensive national policy and implementation 
strategy for protecting critical infrastructures from physical and cyber threats" 
[Information Assurance 1999: ES2]. Specifically, the PCCIP was tasked to look at the 
five following infrastructure sectors: 
1) Information and Communications 
2) Banking and Finance 
3) Energy, Including Electrical Power, Oil and Gas 
4) Physical Distribution 
5) Vital Human Services [PCCIP, 1997: 2]. 
Critical Infrastructures form the backbone of the country; they include such 
entities as highways, water supplies, electric companies, and financial institutions. They 
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exist to support the citizens of the U. S. and their economy. These infrastructures bring 
citizens services they cannot provide for themselves. The PCCIP states: 
The development of the computer and its astonishingly rapid 
improvements have ushered in the Information Age that affects almost all 
aspects of American commerce and society. Our security, economy, way 
of life, and perhaps even survival, are now dependent on the interrelated 
trio of electrical energy, communications, and computers [PCCIP, 1997: 
3]. 
All infrastructures, military and civilian, are computer operated in one form or another 
and thus susceptible to an information attack. 
In the 1997 exercise ELIGIBLE RECEIVER, a covert simulated attack on the 
nation's infrastructures ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proved that by using only 
open source intelligence and widely available hacker tools that U. S. infrastructures were 
quite vulnerable to malicious attack [Information Assurance 1999: ES3]. These finding 
were proven to be true in 1998 when a group of U. S. teenagers and an Israeli mentor 
were able to penetrate DoD logistics, finance, and personnel records in what came to be 
known as the SOLAR SUNRISE intrusions [Information Assurance, 1999: ES3]. If a 
group of U. S. teenagers were able to gain unauthorized access into these systems with 
relative ease, then certainly a highly trained hostile force could enter these systems and 
cause tremendous damage. 
In response to ELIGIBLE RECEIVER and SOLAR SUNRISE, the White House 
released Presidential Decision Directive 63 in May of 1998 which: 
1) Established a national goal for infrastructure protection 
2) Created a national structure much like that recommended by the 
President's Commission 
3) Provided guidelines on infrastructure protection 
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4) Required each Federal department and agency to assign IA 
responsibilities to the Chief Information Officer and appoint a Chief 
Infrastructure Assurance Officer 
5) Called for a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan to address specific 
tasks such as vulnerability analyses, warning, response, reconstitution, 
etc. [Information Assurance, 1999: ES3]. 
A national plan similar to the DoD assurance objectives was called for to protect 
critical infrastructures. Presidential Directive 63 made information assurance a national 
concern, although it took a near disaster for this to occur. Private business also followed 
suit after realizing that they were also targets for cyber attack. 
2.5 Private Sector IA Concerns 
The Internet created a brand new business market and communication medium for 
people around the world to utilize. If a product exists, chances are it is available from the 
Internet through either a retailer or a private individual. "With information from many 
sources but a click away ... this globe-spanning network's ability to let us check and 
compare prices for similar goods and services" generally offers the consumer a lower 
cost than the neighborhood store [Harrow, 1998]. 
The Internet allows consumers the ability to search for and purchase goods 
directly from their own home, making shopping more convenient and less expensive. 
However, there are risks associated with purchasing goods via the Internet; personal 
financial information, whether a valid credit card number, checking account, or other 
data, is required. A faulty security system, even on a trusted site, could lead to 
unauthorized persons fraudulently using stolen information to purchase on-line goods and 
services. 
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An experienced hacker or group of hackers could steal thousands of credit card 
numbers a day if they are able to bypass a site's security system. One group of eleven 
people, known as the "Phone Masters," accomplished such a feat by breaking into several 
local and long distance telephone companies, credit reporting firms, and even the FBI's 
Crime Information Center [Holzinger, 2000: 32]. The group stole consumer credit card 
information and sold it worldwide. An estimated $1.1 to $1.5 million dollars was lost 
due to "Phone Master" activities; FBI agent Michael Morris stated "They could have - 
temporarily at least - crippled the nation's phone network.. .What scares me the most is 
that [the Phone Masters gang] could have done a lot more damage" [Holzinger, 2000: 
32]. 
In a recent survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers and Information Week magazine of 
1,600 information security professionals in 50 countries, it was determined that on-line 
businesses were found to be the most at risk group for Internet attacks. The survey found 
that on-line businesses could expect three times the amount of attempted hacks to their 
system compared to non-commerce sites, and they could lose up to seven times more 
revenue due to these hacks [Holzinger, 2000: 33]. 
Many corporations, DoD organizations, and other interest groups use their World 
Wide Web sites not for business but to help expand their influence or provide information 
to users and subscribers. While these sites are not attacked for financial gain, they are 
often attacked simply to prove it can be done or to protest some social or political point 
of view. The chart from CERT, shown as Figure 1-1 in Chapter 1, illustrates the growing 
trend of malicious Internet attacks. 
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The widespread use of electronic mail (e-mail) has created another opportunity 
for malicious attack on computer systems. In May of 2000, the "I Love You" computer 
virus passed through an estimated 500,000 systems, crippling numerous sites by flooding 
their email and erasing countless multimedia files [CERT: Advisory, 2000]. 
Another barrier in the search for universal IA concerns the legal ramifications of 
the Internet. Currently, U. S. codes of law dictate that "concepts of jurisdiction are 
principally based on notions of physical presence within a jurisdiction" [Donohue, 1997: 
7]. However, a crime can be committed via the Internet from almost any location in the 
world, which makes capturing and trying suspected Internet criminals very difficult. 
There are three specific factors of the Internet that makes legal prosecution nearly 
impossible: 
Location of Machines: The Internet permits interaction between people 
who do not know each other's physical locations, therefore they cannot 
know the laws of the other's persons residence 
Caching: The process where information to servers is copied on the user's 
hard drive so that future trips to the same Web site will be less time 
consuming. While caching is essential to the speed of operation, it 
prevents the computer from distinguishing an original source from a 
cache. 
Hyperlink: Allows one Web site to connect to another, regardless of 
location. One Web site may be in a certain legal jurisdiction, while the 
other may not. A legal dilemma arises when the nonresident site posts 
illegal subject matter (however defined in that jurisdiction) through the 
resident site [Donohue, 1997: 7-8]. 
These legal issues concerning Internet crime are quite extensive and will not be 
easily solved. What is legal in one area may not be legal in another area; therefore 
determining when and where a crime took place can be extremely difficult. Even if a 
location was identified as the source of the crime, determining the person behind the 
22 
computer screen, and whether or not it was a state sponsored attack, can be an even 
harder task. 
2.6 Measures of Effectiveness and Past Models 
The historical development and nature of the Internet makes securing it very 
difficult. The Internet was created to allow information to flow freely between trusted 
users. Today, it is increasingly difficult to determine exactly who has access to what 
information. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Research Program on 
Communication Policy realized that the original intent of the Internet must be preserved 
when making security regulations. They outlined four principles that they feel need to be 
adhered to with regard to information assurance: 
1) Open Architecture: Policies that permit interconnection among 
different telecommunications and information systems and services; 
2) Open Access: Capacity for any subject to enter and compete in the 
telecommunication and information markets; 
3) Universal Access: Eliminate physical barriers that hamper general 
access; 
4) Flexible Access: Eliminate technical barriers that hamper general 
access [Valeri, 2000: 133]. 
While all of these principles may not directly apply to military systems, they do illustrate 
the tension between competing agendas. 
Information assurance that degrades the operational capability of a system to the 
point where it is no longer useful serves no advantage. The Internet has proved to be too 
useful a tool to close it off to the world. It is important to keep as much information 
readily available to the authorized users as possible; placing restrictive security measures 
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across the Internet is not the desired solution. Some systems, however, need to remain 
secure. It is therefore the goal of this study to provide a model where public information 
remains accessible and sensitive information remains guarded. 
The ever-growing number of security software manufactures prevents product 
equality. Consumers can never be quite sure that the product they are purchasing is 
actually doing what the software company claims it can. To combat this problem, the 
National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) collaborated in 1997 to form the National Information Assurance Partnership 
(NIAP). The NIAP is a "U. S. Government initiative designed to meet the security 
testing, evaluation, and assessment needs of both information technology (IT) producers 
and consumers" [NAIP: About, 2001]. The NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and 
Validation Scheme for IT Security is a program that specifically "helps consumers select 
commercial off-the-shelf IT products that meet their security requirements and to help 
manufacturers of those products gain acceptance in the global marketplace" [NAIP: 
Introduction, 1999]. Forcing software manufacturers to produce quality, secure 
information technologies on a consistent basis will reduce the number of competitors 
selling unsatisfactory products. 
2.7 Value Focused Thinking 
Every organization is different and therefore will have a different perspective on 
IA, and the impact of IA on its system operational capability and resource costs. 
Organizations that hold very sensitive information will tend to choose aggressive IA 
strategies potentially sacrificing operational capability. Likewise, organizations that 
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value the use of the system more than controlling the access and integrity of the 
information contained in the system will tend to choose IA strategies that minimally 
impact their operational capability. This is the viewpoint that Value Focused Thinking 
(VFT) takes in the study, where the values of the decision-maker(s) are captured and 
consequently pursued, rather than having the decision-maker choose between 
predetermined lists of alternatives. R. L. Keeney, pioneer of VFT, states, "values are 
what we fundamentally care about in decision-making. Alternatives are simply means to 
achieve our values" [Keeney, 1994: 793]. 
Perhaps the most import element of the decision-making process is to follow a 
scientific method that will lead to the desired results. The following simple, yet 
extremely important steps should be followed when making an important and difficult 
decision: 
1) Specify objectives and scales for measuring achievement with respect 
to those objectives 
2) Develop alternatives that potentially might achieve the objective 
3) Determine how well each alternative achieves each objective 
4) Consider tradeoffs among the objectives 
5) Select the alternative that, on balance, best achieves the objectives, 
taking into account uncertainties [Kirkwood, 1997: 3]. 
2.7.1 Value Hierarchies 
The first step in VFT is to develop a value hierarchy based upon what the 
decision-maker feels is important to the success of the decision. All value hierarchies 
must be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive [Kirkwood 1997: 17]. Mutual 
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exclusivity in a value hierarchy means that each specific value is only counted once. This 
prevents a value from being over represented because it is inappropriately counted more 
than one time. Collectively exhaustive signifies that all the key values of the decision- 
maker are contained within the model. Failing to represent a value could lead to a 
decision inconsistent with the decision-maker's true values. 
A prototype IA value hierarchy developed by Captain Todd Hamill, USAF, 
depicted as Figure 2-3 (measures not shown), will be used to illustrate the VFT process 
from beginning to end. This thesis builds upon Hamill's work and therefore it is 
beneficial to introduce VFT using his hierarchies as opposed to a notional example. 
Information Assurance 
I 
Information & IS Protection Detection 
Defense in Depth 
Compliance 





— Physical Attacks 













Figure 2-3: Hamill's IA Value Hierarchy [Hamill, 2000: 4-3] 
In Hamill's IA hierarchy, the decision-maker's fundamental values in relation to 
information assurance are Information & Information Systems (IS) Protection, Detection, 
and Reaction. Since it was determined that Information & Information Systems (IS) 
Protection, Detection, and Reaction could not be directly measured, they were 
decomposed until single dimensional, measurable values were obtained. Together, the 
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hierarchy is collectively exhaustive since it captures every key value associated with 
information assurance (according to this specific decision-maker), and mutually exclusive 
since no two values are the same. 
2.7.2 Value Measures 
Once the value hierarchy is established, the decision-maker and analyst again 
work to establish single dimensional value functions to quantifiably measure each value 
within the hierarchy. The measure functions are set so that the best possible outcome 
scores a 1.0 and the worst possible outcome scores a 0.0 [Kirkwood, 1997: 68]. All other 
outcomes fall somewhere between 0.0 and 1.0. The relationships of the measure 
functions are required to be either monotonically increasing or decreasing over the range 
of the value. 
Consider the value Integrity found under the Information & Information Systems 
(IS) Protection column of HamilPs IA hierarchy. In order to determine if a system has 
integrity, it must be able to be measured. Hamill further decomposed Integrity into Data 
Integrity and System Integrity. Figure 2-4 illustrates the two measure functions for the 
value Integrity: 
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Figure 2-4: Data Integrity Measure [Hamill, 2000: A-34] and System Integrity Measure [Hamill, 2000: A-36] 
Measure functions may be categorical, discrete, piecewise linear, or continuous so long 
as they are monotonic and have non-negative values [Kirkwood, 1997:64-65]. In this 
example, the value ranges from 0.0 to 10.0, although this may be arbitrary so long as they 
are consistent. The finalized single dimensional measure functions built in this study and 
presented in Chapter 3 are on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0. 
The exponential mathematical function is used to approximate continuous 
functions, where p (the Greek letter "rho") represents the exponential constant. The 
exponential single dimensional value function for monotonically increasing preferences, 
such as shown in the System Integrity graph in Figure 2-4, is given as Equation 2-1: 
1 - exp[- (x - Low) I p] 
v(x)= 1 - exp[-(High - Low) I p] 
x - Low 
, otherwise 
High - Low 
,p*co 
Equation 2-1: Monotonically Increasing Exponential Single Dimensional Value Function [Kirkwood, 1997: 65] 
The exponential single dimensional value function for monotonically decreasing 
preferences is given as Equation 2-2: 
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1 - exp[- (High - x) I p] 
vW = 1 - exp[-(High - Low) I p] High - x 
,P* 00 
High - Low 
,otherwise 
Equation 2-2: Monotonically Decreasing Exponential Single Dimensional Value Function [Kirkwood, 1997: 66] 
The value of/? is determined by measure function's curve. Measures with a large curve 
will have lower p values, and measures with flatter curves will have high p values. A 
perfectly straight line will have a p of infinity [Kirkwood, 1997: 65]. Figure 2-5 shows 
examples of increasing and decreasing exponential single dimensional value functions as 
p is varied: 
Increasing Preferences Decreasing Preferences 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Evaluation Measure (Score) Evaluation Measure (Score) 
Figure 2-5: Exponential Single Dimensional Value Function Examples [Kirkwood, 1997: 65]. 
The continuous functions used in this project were approximated using the above 
equations implemented in a Microsoft Excel © spreadsheet program. 
2.7.3 Swing Weighting 
Based on the ranges of these functions (its least preferred value to its most 
preferred value), the decision-maker must weight each measure within the value with 
respect to all others, then each value within the column, and finally each column within 
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the hierarchy [Kirkwood, 1997: 70]. This establishes a local and a global weight for each 
value; the local weight is used to measure the importance of the value within the column, 
and the global weight determines the degree of impact the value will have on an 
alternative's final value score. 
Swing weighting is a technique whereby the "weight for an evaluation measure is 
equal to the increment in value that is received from moving the score on that evaluation 
measure from its least preferred level to its most preferred level" [Kirkwood, 1997: 68]. 
In the example from Hamill's hierarchy, the decision-maker would determine if a change 
from no Data Integrity (value 0.0) to automated-full Data Integrity (value 1.0) was more 
or less valuable than a change from 0% System Integrity (value 0.0) to 100% System 
Integrity (value 1.0). The relative importance of the value increments are compared, and 
whichever is greater will be weighted accordingly. This technique of comparison 
weighting, which ultimately produces ratios of relative importance within each tier of the 
hierarchy, provides a more accurate representation of the decision-maker's true value 
preferences then weighting without comparison. 
For example, suppose the decision-maker determined that the value increment 
gained by going from 0% System Integrity to 100% System Integrity was three times as 
important as the value gained by going from no Data Integrity to automated-full Data 
Integrity. The System Integrity measure would therefore be weighted three times the 
Data Integrity measure, which on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0, would result in 0.75 and 0.25 
respectively. This process would be continued in order to weight Integrity against the 
other values in the Information and IS Protection column, and then to weight Information 
and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction against themselves. 
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It is essential to remember that the ranges on each measure are the most important 
factor when determining weights. Generally, the weight of the value will decrease as the 
range of the value decreases. Suppose a company executive wants to purchase an 
automobile, and for simplicity's sake, bases his choice of cars on two values: cost and 
color. Assume that the decision to buy has been made and will not change. When asked 
to weight these values with respect to each other, most decision-makers would 
immediately weight cost much higher than color because they believe cost will always be 
more important. However, if the decision-maker were told that all the cars ranged on 
cost from $15,000 to $15,100 (a mere $100 difference) then that person may very well 
weight color above cost since the relative range on cost was so small the decision-maker 
became essentially indifferent towards the alternatives (with respect to cost). If two cars 
cost about the same, then the executive would buy the one that came in the color he liked 
most. Swing weighting captures these scale differences and allows the decision-maker to 
weight values based on the decision, and not on past prejudices. 
2.7.4 Alternative Overall Value Score 
After measure functions have been created for each value and assigned their 
appropriate weight, as determined by decision-maker preferences, strategies can then 
receive their final overall value score. An alternative's overall value score is calculated 
by multiplying the global weight of each measure by its respective specific measure value 




Equation 2-3: Additive Value Function 
Where: 
• 2J /I; = 1 is the requirement for normalization; 
• «is the number of objectives (or the number of single dimensional value 
functions); 
• X\ is the global weight for the ith objective; 
• Vj(Xj) is the value of the alternative with respect to the i   objective; and, 
• v(x) is the overall value of an alternative [Hamill, 2000: 2-31]. 
2.7.5 Alternative Rankings 
The next step of the VFT process after creating and properly weighting the value 
hierarchy is to determine a Baseline Case to which all other alternatives may be 
compared. While not necessary in all VFT studies, it was determined that baselining the 
current system would help to identify value gaps, which are defined to be weaknesses in 
critical areas in the current operating system. Alternatives can then be tailored to address 
these value gaps. This is the essence of VFT - creating decision alternatives that address 
the decision-maker's values. The decision-maker is not forced to choose from a 
predetermined set of alternatives; they now have the ability to create their own solution 
guided by their explicitly elicited values. The alternatives are scored based upon 
measures created to represent each value. Again, every value must have at least one 
measure so that an alternative may receive a score in that value. The alternative that 
obtains the highest combined score from Equation 2-3 is therefore the best alternative 
because it addresses the decision-maker's values better than any other did. If this is not 
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the case, a review of the hierarchy may very well disclose previously unrevealed or 
missing values and objectives. 
A sensitivity analysis can be done on each value weight to see if there is a point 
where the alternatives will change their rank order. This becomes an important part of 
the analysis if there are any concerns regarding hierarchy weighting. If the hierarchy is 
found to be very sensitive, then further analysis may be needed to make certain the 
weights are correct. Sensitive weights are ones that will reorder alternative rankings if 
changed within the anticipated possible range of variation. Conversely, insensitive 
weights are not likely to change the alternatives' rankings, mitigating any concern 
regarding that particular weight. 
Value Focused Thinking was chosen in this study because virtually any properly 
constructed model can, with care, be fine-tuned and applied to many different 
organizations. Information assurance is important to every DoD agency and to the 
civilian sector as well. Assisting decision-makers in improving IA is an essential analysis 
tool. Decision-makers will value the objectives in the hierarchies differently depending 
on their particular circumstance; the weighting process allows this differentiation to 
occur. VFT provides a platform to develop a model that is general enough to be used 
across a wide spectrum of organizations, yet can be specifically tailored to meet each 
individual organization's unique mission. 
2.8 Past Models 
This thesis builds upon previous work presented in a March 2000 Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AFIT) Master's Thesis effort by Captain Todd Hamill, USAF. 
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It is a premise of this study that measures of effectiveness be developed in order to 
quantify the level of IA for a specified organization. Once the organization's current 
state of IA is determined, different alternatives are then analyzed to show where the most 
improvement could be gained. However, improving IA impacts system operational 
capability and resource costs, so it is also necessary to model these elements. The three 
separate models were used together to analyze AFTAC, as mentioned in Chapter 1. 
AFTAC is able to see the value that each alternative had with respect to each model, 
which allows them to have the opportunity to make a final decision as to what, if any, 
changes they needed to make to their system. 
Hamill's information assurance hierarchy originated from the doctrine discussed 
in previous sections, past AFIT models, and IA experts. The first attempt to model 
information assurance at AFIT can be found in Captain Michael P. Doyle's et al "A Value 
Function Approach to Information Operations MOE's: A Preliminary Study." Doyle's 
hierarchy is shown as Figure 2-6. 
Although the hierarchy is entitled Defensive Information Operations (10) and not 
Information Assurance, the top tier of the hierarchy was derived from the JP 3-13 
definition of IA, which again states that IA must include measures taken to restore 
"information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities" 
[JP 3-13,1998:1-9]. The hierarchy separates Reaction into Capability Restoration and 
10 Attack Response. 
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Figure 2-6: Defensive 10 [Doyle, Deckro, Jackson, and Kloeber, 1997: 36, JP 3-13, 1998] 
Hamill built upon Doyle's research with emphasis on making a model that could 
be used by a variety of different organizations. Realizing that IA would likely impact the 
system operational capability and consume resources, Hamill created three separate value 
hierarchies: Information Assurance, Operational Capability, and Resource Costs. 
Hamill's hierarchies were used as a starting point to model information assurance at 
AFTAC, the organization chosen for this study. Figure 2-7 is Hamill's complete IA 
Value Hierarchy; values are shown in the boxes, with their respective measure functions 
shown as ovals. 
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System Integrity"""^} 
Figure 2-7: Hamill's Information Assurance Value Hierarchy [Hamill, 2000: A-64] 
Hamill developed separate models for operational capability and the resource costs of 
implementing a new IA strategy since information assurance would likely impact them. 
Figure 2-8 and Figure 2-9 present these value hierarchies along with their associated 
measures: 
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Figure 2-9: Hamill's Resource Costs Value Hierarchy [Hamill, 2000: 4-17] 
It is important to note that Hamill's hierarchies were used to aid AFTAC 
personnel as a starting point in determining how they value information assurance. The 
hierarchies were not presented as the single, correct manner in which to model 
information assurance; Chapter 3 will show that the final hierarchies changed 
significantly. The conceptual models developed by Hamill afford a baseline which, 
coupled with this study, provides a guide to tailor an IA analysis to a specific 
organization and system. 
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2.9 Methodology 
This chapter presented a literature review detailing why information assurance is 
important and some previous attempts to measure it. Chapter 2 also presented a solid 
theoretical and practical basis for the methodology used to model information assurance 
at AFTAC, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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3. Methodology 
The previous two chapters detailed the importance of Information Assurance and 
the benefits of developing a quantitative model of IA. However, the models reviewed in 
Chapter 2 have not been fully tested on operational systems that contain sensitive 
information. The primary objective of this research was to build on past models, Joint 
Doctrine, and area experts to develop an IA model that would be applied to an 
operational system. HamiU's work and joint doctrine provided a solid starting point; 
however it was not until the values and expertise of IA personnel were captured that the 
prototype model was fine tuned for a specific operating system. This chapter focuses on 
the process used to analyze information assurance at AFT AC. 
3.1 Model Development 
Value Focused Thinking (VFT) was used to develop an Information Assurance 
Analysis Model. It was determined that measuring the level of IA alone was not 
sufficient since any IA modifications to a system are highly likely to impact the 
capability of the system, and the modifications generally cost the organization some 
amount of resources.   The main goal of this thesis is to provide a model that will assist 
organizations in making IA decisions. In order to accomplish that goal, the entire 
decision to implement an IA strategy, to include the level of assurance attained, the 
resource costs consumed by the strategy, and the effects on system operational capability 
must be considered. 
An IA strategy is defined to be either a physical upgrade (hardware, software, or 
physical security), a change in policy with the intent of improving information assurance, 
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or some combination of the two. The best IA strategies will increase information 
assurance, increase the system operational capability, and can to be implemented at a low 
cost to the organization. Figure 3-1 portrays the relationship between Information 
Assurance (IA), the Impact of Information Assurance on Operational Capability (IOC), 
and the Impact of Information Assurance on Resource Costs (IRC), with Best Case 































Figure 3-1: The relationship between Information Assurance (IA), the Impact of IA on System Operational 
Capability (IOC), and the Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC) [modified from Hamill, 2000: 4-2] 
The model used to measure the decision to implement an IA strategy, the Information 
Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM), is composed of three separate hierarchies: IA, IOC, 
and IRC and is shown in Figure 3-2: 
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Information Assurance 
Analysis Model (IAAM) 
*^^                         ir                         ^^^ 
Information Assurance 
(IA) 
Impact of IA on System 
Operational Capability (IOC) 
Impact of IA on Resource 
Costs (IRC) 
Figure 3-2: Information Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM) 
The objective of the IAAM is to assist a decision-maker in determining which, if 
any, IA strategies should be implemented. The level of information assurance at the 
organization is captured in the IA hierarchy. It was not the objective of the model to 
measure overall system operational capability or the current resource costs absorbed by 
the organization, so these hierarchies do not attempt to do so. The latter two hierarchies 
simply capture what impact implementing a new IA strategy has on the system 
operational capability and resource costs, respectively. 
The IA, IOC and IRC hierarchies were developed over a series of three separate 
two to two and a half day meetings with AFT AC / Logistic Support Center (LSC) 
personnel. Over twenty different information systems experts, including officers, 
enlisted personnel, civilians, and civilian contractors participated in this study. Expert 
opinion of all personnel involved with AFT AC information assurance, from senior 
leadership to technical specialists, was carefully noted and incorporated into the models 
[AFTAC / LSC, 2000-2001]. This study could not have been completed without the truly 
extraordinary effort put forth by the AFTAC personnel. 
The Information Assurance hierarchy will be discussed first, followed by the 
Impact of IA on System Operational Capability hierarchy and then the Impact of IA on 
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Resource Cost hierarchy. A more detailed discussion of each value and its respective 
measures can be found in the Appendix. 
3.2 Information Assurance Value Hierarchy 
The IA hierarchy measures the ability of the system and system personnel to 
assure information, information systems, and information processes. The hierarchy 
obtains its fundamental focus from the definition of IA found in JP 3-13: Joint Doctrine 
for Information Operations: 
Information assurance is defined as Information Operations (10) that 
protect and defend information systems by ensuring their availability, 
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes 
providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating 
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities [JP 3-13,1998:1-9]. 
Information Assurance is therefore a process that involves the ability to protect 
information and information systems (IS), detect events that may interfere with 
information or IS, and properly react to situations where information or IS may have been 
compromised. The above definition shows that IA is not a synonym for computer 
security; assurance is a much more robust concept that captures the entire process of 
defending one's information, information systems, and information processes. Working 
from JP 3-13 and the IA experts at AFT AC, it was therefore determined that an IA value 
hierarchy for AMIS should be composed of protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities. The entire IA value hierarchy is given as Figure 3-3, with Information and 
IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction composing the highest sub-tier of values. 
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Information Assurance 



































Figure 3-3: Information Assurance (IA) Value Hierarchy 
3.2.1 Information and Information Systems (IS) Protection 
Information and IS Protection is defined to be the measures taken to ensure that 
information and information systems are protected from unauthorized change. This 
includes assuring information and IS availability, confidentiality, and integrity. In 
addition, AFT AC information assurance experts determined that compliance should also 
be included under the Information and IS Protection sub-hierarchy since it captures the 
ability of the system to protect against known vulnerabilities. Each of these sub- 
hierarchy elements are defined as follows: 
Availability: Assured access by authorized users 
Confidentiality: Protection from unauthorized disclosure 
Integrity: Protection from unauthorized change 
Compliance: Measures taken to decrease known vulnerabilities 
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Single dimensional value functions were developed to measure each of these sub-values. 
Table 3-1 summarizes the measures used for each value under Information and IS 
Protection: 
Table 3-1: Evaluation Measures for Information and IS Protection 












































* (Shape) of value function, if applicable. 
Table 3-1 shows that Availability has four separate single dimensional measure functions 
since AFTAC personnel valued E-mail, Print, File, and Internet services on AMIS 
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Figure 3-4: Measure function for Percentage of Time E-mail Service is Available 
The function is an S-shaped curve ranging from 80% to 100%. Any information 
assurance strategy that would likely cause E-mail services on AMIS to be available 80% 
of the time or less would receive a value of 0.0. This value increases slightly until 90% 
availability, after which it begins to rise sharply. The sharp rise between 90% and 95% 
availability signifies that AFTAC personnel value gains in this area more than any other 
of the same magnitude. After 95% availability, AFTAC personnel feel that the service is 
sufficiently available and therefore any gain above this level is not as valuable, although 
obviously welcomed. Measure functions, such as shown in Figure 3-4, were also 
developed for Print, File, and Internet services as well as all other values in the three 
hierarchies. The complete collection of all values and their associated measure 
function(s) can be found with a more detailed explanation in the Appendix. 
45 
It is important to note that all alternatives, for this hierarchy and for the IRC and 
IOC hierarchies, were scored in relation to the Baseline Case. This will be discussed in 
more detail during the discussion on alternative scoring found in Chapter 4. 
3.2.2 Detection 
Detection is defined to be the ability of the system or system personnel to detect 
an event. AFT AC personnel defined an event is any abnormal activity or action that 
could potentially compromise the system or information contained within the system. An 
event must be detected before any action can be taken. In order for an organization to 
gain value from their detection capabilities, it must be done quickly, accurately, and at a 
sufficient level. Detection is therefore separated into three sub-values: Timely, 
Accountability, and Flexibility. 
It is important to detect events as soon as possible since earlier detection will 
allow earlier reaction, and provide the potential to minimize any negative impact of the 
event. Although rapid detection is desired for any event, Timely is separated into sub- 
categories because an IA strategy may have different detection capabilities and needs 
depending on the method and origin of the event. The categories are composed of either 
a physical event, which is any event affecting information or information systems 
originating from a physical source (i.e. a fire), or an electronic event, defined to be an 
event originating through communication networks. These categories are further 
separated into events with either internal or external origins, since the organization values 
their ability to detect events in a timely fashion differently depending on their origin. 
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Note that whether an event is a result of malicious intent or an accident, it must be 
detected in a timely manner. 
Accountability is defined as the ability of a system to detect and correctly classify 
events. This value is important because an event that is detected and classified 
incorrectly, or not at all, could impede the ability of the organization to properly respond. 
Accountability is separated into the Ability to Detect an Event and the Ability to Classify 
an Event. The Ability to Detect an Event measures the system or system personnel's 
ability to determine if an event actually occurred or is occurring. An organization that is 
able to detect a high percentage of system events will be better able to protect against any 
possible harm the event may cause. The Ability to Classify an Event captures the ability 
of the system to correctly classify a detected event. It is important to properly categorize 
events so that appropriate action may be taken. 
Flexibility was defined as the ability to increase or decrease detection fidelity 
based on the current INFOCON level. AFTAC personnel felt that is would be 
advantageous to have the ability to adjust its level of assurance based on the current 
threat level. In a low threat environment, AFTAC would operate at normal assurance 
levels; as the threat level increases, so does AFTAC s need for information assurance. 
There is a trade-off that exists between increasing system assurance and operational 
capability. The consideration of this trade-off is why AFTAC would not necessarily want 
to operate at the highest possible assurance level in a low threat environment. Table 3-2 
summarizes the measures used in the Detection sub-hierarchy: 
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Table 3-2: Evaluation Measures for Detection 
VALUE SUB- 




















































Piecewise Linear 0 100 
Flexibility Is System Flexible? Category No Yes 
* (Shape) of value function, if applicable. 
3.2.3 Reaction 
Reaction, in this study, is defined to be measures taken to (1) appropriately 
respond to an identified attack, (2) restore the information and IS capabilities to an 
acceptable state, their original state, or an improved state, and (3) the ability to learn from 
previous events so that they do not cause damage in the future. Reaction is thus 
separated into Respond, Restore, and Adapt. The period after an event is detected is 
critical to the organization because this is the point at which any potential compromise 
can be minimized and contained. The manner in which an organization reacts to the 
event is of high importance since it could determine the extent to which information was 
compromised. 
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Respond captures the ability of the system or system personnel to take the proper 
action during an event or after an event has occurred. It is separated into three values, 
defined as follows: 
Timely: The process of notifying the appropriate personnel after detecting 
an event, identifying the event source, and then taking the proper action 
against the event 
Flexible Deterrence: Taking appropriate action at the appropriate time. 
Verify: Ability of the system or system administrators to determine if 
their actions, which include detecting, classifying, and responding to an 
event, were appropriate. 
Restore is defined to be the ability of the system and system personnel to restore 
information or an information system to an acceptable level after an event. This must be 
done in both a timely and accurate manner; thus Restore is separated into those respective 
sub-values. Information must be restored quickly so that system personnel have access to 
it and are able to use the information to perform their mission. Information that is 
incorrect, however, has no value to system personnel since processing tainted information 
could have a severe negative impact on the mission. The restoration of incorrect 
information is therefore not acceptable. 
The final value under the Reaction sub-hierarchy is Adapt / Learn. This is 
defined to be the ability of the system or system personnel to learn from an event and 
adapt to the new situations resulting from the event. Part of reacting to an event is 
learning from that event so it does not occur in the future, and therefore cannot 
compromise the system again. It is also important that personnel learn from any mistakes 
made in the assurance process so that they will be better able to control future events. 
Table 3-3 details the measure functions for the Reaction sub-hierarchy: 
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Table 3-3: Evaluation Measures for Reaction 
VALUE SUB- 
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* (Shape) of value function, if applicable. 
Again, the Appendix presents a full explanation of the values and associated measure 
functions. 
3.3 The Impact of IA on System Operational Capability 
The impact that an information assurance strategy will have on the system's 
operational capability must be considered when determining what IA strategy or 
strategies are best for a given organization. The purpose of an information system is to 
help personnel accomplish their mission in a more efficient manner; if the system cannot 
do this effectively then it is not a useful system. However, if the user cannot trust that 
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information in the system is available, accurate, updated, and secure, then the user's 
willingness to depend on the system is greatly decreased. There is a fine balance between 
information assurance and system operational capability that must exist in order to have a 
secure but usable system. 
In order to isolate the impact of IA on system operational capability, the IOC 
hierarchy captures only the impact that an IA strategy will have on the system, not the 
overall system operational capability. Therefore, many of the measures are categorical 
changes with respect to the baseline system. For example, as shown in Table 3-4, one 
measure for Efficiency was the Ability to Process Users. This measure was composed of 
the following categories, all in relation to the Baseline Case: Significantly Decreased, 
Decreased, No Change, Increased, and Significantly Increased. When the baseline AMIS 
system was scored, it received a 'No Change' since it did not impact current system 
efficiency. The Baseline Case scored a 'No Change' for all such IOC measures. Figure 
3-5 presents the complete IOC hierarchy: 
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Figure 3-5: Impact of Information Assurance on System Operational Capability (IOC) Value Hierarchy 
3.3.1 Efficiency 
An efficient system can perform the required tasks quickly and consistently with 
respect to the demands placed upon the system. It is important that the system is able to 
process user demands rapidly and without fear of overloading the system. Efficiency is 
therefore separated into the Ability of the System to Process Users and the Impact an IA 
strategy will have on System Overhead. The Ability of the System to Process Users is 
valuable since the system is in place to assist personnel in accomplishing their mission. 
The speed at which they are able to perform the mission is critical to its success. The 
impact an IA strategy will have on System Overhead is important because an IA strategy 
that consumes too much system capacity will limit the system's ability to efficiently 
process information. Again, these values are not designed to measure the overall 
system's capabilities; they are designed to measure what impact an IA strategy will have 
on system capabilities. Measure functions for Efficiency are detailed in Table 3-4: 
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Table 3-4: Evaluation Measures for Efficiency 

















* (Shape) of value function, if applicable. 
3.3.2 Functionality 
Functionality is defined as the usefulness offered to system clients by providing 
information and information related capabilities, both desired and essential. This 
includes the change in how often the system is Available due to an IA strategy and 
whether or not the new IA strategy is Compatible with the existing system. Missions 
Enabled is also included as a value since adding a new capability to the system would 
increase its functionality. Based on AFT AC personnel expert opinion, it was determined 
IA strategies that removed a critical mission or function would never be considered for 
implementation for the system under study. Measure functions for Functionality are 
explained in Table 3-5: 
Table 3-5: Evaluation Measures for Functionality 








Did Strategy enable System to 
Perform new Mission? 
Category No Yes 




Compatibility Difficulty in Making New 
Strategy Compatible 
Category Complex No Difficulty 
" (Shape) of value function, if applicable. 
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3.3.3 Convenience 
Convenience is the level of complication needed to operate the system viewed 
from both the user and administrator perspective. Convenience is separated into 
Accessibility, which is the level of difficulty faced by the user in gaining access to 
authorized systems, and Complexity, defined as the level of difficulty in using the 
system, again for both for users and support personnel. Complexity was further separated 
into User and Support Personnel since AFTAC experts deemed that it was far better to 
have a system that it is easy for users to operate, yet more difficult for support personnel 
to maintain, than it would be to have an easily maintainable system that was difficult to 
use. Recall system availability has already been scored in a separate measure and is 
therefore not considered under Convenience. Table 3-6 explains the measure functions 
for Convenience: 




































* (Shape) of value function, if applicable. 
3.3.4 Ease of Implementation 
The degree of difficulty associated with installing a new IA strategy is an 
important consideration when comparing strategies. Ease of Implementation is 
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composed of two separate values: the Time needed to Implement and Test a strategy, and 
the Usage History ofthat strategy. The faster an IA strategy can be tested and 
implemented, the earlier it can begin protecting the system and the less potential 
disruption it will have on the users. Usage History is the 'track record' of an IA strategy 
and is important because it gives personnel insight on how well the product or policy 
fared in the past in similar situations. Usage History contains measures for both the 
actual history of the product or policy as well as experience system personnel have with 
using and / or maintaining it. Table 3-7 details measurement functions for the value Ease 
of Implementation: 
Table 3-7: Evaluation Measures for Ease of Implementation 
VALUE SUB- 
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3.3.5 Flexibility 
The final value in the Impact of IA on System Operational Capability is 
Flexibility, which in this hierarchy is defined to be the ability of the system to change 
over time as technology evolves. The ability of the system to change with technology is 
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dependent on its ability to be both Upgraded and Expanded, which is captured in the 
model with those respective values. AFT AC experts determined that Upgradeability and 
Expandability are binary Yes or No values since there was no clear measure to the degree 
that all possible strategies are either upgradeable or expandable. This is further explained 
in the Appendix. Measure functions for Flexibility are explained in Table 3-8: 
Table 3-8: Evaluation Measures for Flexibility 





Upgradeability Can Strategy be Upgraded? Category No Yes 
Expandability Can Strategy be Expanded? Category No Yes 
* (Shape) of value function, if applicable. 
3.4 Impact of IA on Resource Costs 
The final consideration when determining what IA strategies to implement is the 
impact the strategy will have on AFTAC resources. Resources Costs are both the fiscal 
cost and manpower cost that an IA strategy will require. All other things being equal, the 
strategy that requires the least amount of AFTAC resources, either financially or with 
respect to personnel time, will be preferred. The complete IRC value hierarchy is 
presented as Figure 3-6: 
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Figure 3-6: Impact of Information Assurance on Resource Costs (IRC) Value Hierarchy 
3.4.1 Life Cycle Acquisition Costs 
Life Cycle Acquisition Costs is the dollar cost of an IA strategy needed to 
implement and maintain that strategy over its lifetime. As in any acquisition, an IA 
strategy that costs the least to acquire, implement, and maintain will be valued higher 
than more expensive strategies, assuming that they provide an equal amount of assurance. 
Air Force regulations consider computer system acquisitions differently than other 
physical acquisitions; therefore they are treated differently in the value measures (again, 
refer to the Appendix for specific details). Since different IA strategies will have a 
varying life span, the maintenance costs are normalized to be the average dollar cost per 
year. Strategies with a projected life span of twenty years can therefore be compared to 
those with a projected life span of five years. The measure functions for Life Cycle 
Acquisition Costs are explained in Table 3-9: 
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Table 3-9: Evaluation Measures for Life Cycle Acquisition Costs 
VALUE SUB- 
OBJECTIVE 
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* (Shape) of value function, if applicable. 
3.4.2 Personnel 
Along with a dollar cost, implementing and maintaining an IA strategy will 
certainly consume organizational manpower. Users and support personnel are again 
separated since they are valued differently when considering information assurance 
strategies, with preference again given to the user. Although information assurance is 
everyone's duty in the Air Force, user time spent on training in IA or lost due to IA 
procedures is more valued than support personnel's time spent on I A, since information 
assurance is not the primary mission of the information system user. It is, however, the 
job of support personnel to insure that their systems are well assured. Therefore, an IA 
strategy may impact the number of support personnel needed in addition to the support 
personnel's time spent on assurance. This is the rationale for separating the value as 
such. If the strategy automates a process formally done by support personnel, then less 
support personnel may be needed, which in turn would lower the cost to the organization. 
Measure functions for the Resource Cost of Personnel is explained in Table 3-10: 
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Table 3-10: Evaluation Measures for Personnel 
VALUE SUB- 
OBJECTIVE 
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3.5 Weighting 
Each value in the hierarchy was weighted using swing weighting. If a value had 
more than one measure, then each measure was weighted using the same technique. 
Figure 3-7, Figure 3-8, and Figure 3-9 show the weighted Information Assurance (IA), 
Impact of IA on System Operational Capability (IOC), and Impact of IA on Resource 
Cost (IRC) models respectively. Local weights are given above the parenthesized global 
weights. The local weights for any given tier sum to 1.000 as do the global weights. 
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Figure 3-7: Weighted Information Assurance Hierarchy, Global Weight in Parentheses 
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Figure 3-8: Weighted Impact of IA on Operational Capability Hierarchy, Global Weight in Parentheses 
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Figure 3-9: Weighted Impact of IA on Resource Costs Hierarchy, Global Weight in Parentheses 
AFTAC information assurance experts weighted the lower tiers of the IA and IOC 
hierarchies. The top-tier values in the IA and IOC hierarchies were weighted by the 
commanding officers of the Communications and Information Support Division, to 
whom the system experts reported. The commanders are the decision-makers ultimately 
responsible for implementing information assurance strategies. The commanders also 
weighted the complete IRC hierarchy since the acquisition process is directly under their 
authority. 
3.6 Methodology Summary 
This chapter focused on the methodology used to develop, measure, and weight 
the three separate hierarchies in the Information Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM). 
Complete details are provided in the Appendix. The IAAM was used to first baseline the 
system and then to score several information assurance strategies that were being 
considered by AFTAC for implementation. A sensitivity analysis on the hierarchy 
weights will be used to show potential changes in alternative rankings. Chapter 4 will 
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discuss the results produced by the model, and provide insight as to how AFTAC can best 
improve their level of information assurance. 
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4. Results 
The primary objective of this thesis was to provide an information assurance 
model to an operational Department of Defense (DoD) organization to aid in evaluating 
and improving their information security. The previous chapter focused on the 
methodology used to create the Information Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM), which 
was built in cooperation with the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) at 
Patrick AFB, FL. Recall that the IAAM is composed of three separate hierarchies: 
Information Assurance (IA), the Impact of IA on System Operational Capability (IOC), 
and the Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC). Together, these three hierarchies were 
used to evaluate several different information assurance strategies under consideration for 
implementation into the AFTAC Mission Information System (AMIS), the chosen system 
for this study. This chapter will analyze the results of each strategy, as well as provide 
insight as to where AFTAC can best improve their assurance on AMIS. Recall that a 
detailed description of each measure and its associated single dimensional value function 
is provided in the Appendix. The Microsoft Excel © spreadsheet model developed as 
part of this research was used to supplement this analysis. 
4.1 The Baseline System 
In order evaluate improvements in information assurance on AMIS it was first 
necessary to measure its current state of IA. Each proposed alternative could then be 
compared to the current AMIS configuration, the Baseline Case, to determine which 
course of action would most benefit AFTAC s information assurance. The Baseline Case 
and all other alternatives were scored exactly as described in the Value Focused Thinking 
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(VFT) section of Chapter 2. Since AFTAC can choose not to make any modifications to 
AMIS, the Baseline Case is considered an alternative in this study. 
To review, each value within a hierarchy is measured by one or more single 
dimensional value functions that completely capture the value. For example, under the 




Figure 4-1: Availability 
This value is measured by four separate functions: percentage of time E-mail service is 
available, percentage of time Print service is available, percentage of time File service is 
available, and percentage of time Internet service is available. The function measuring 
the percentage of time E-mail Service is available, developed with AFTAC information 
assurance experts, is shown in Figure 4-2: 
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Figure 4-2: Measure function for Percentage of Time E-mail Service is Available 
During the scoring session, AFTAC experts were asked to determine what percentage of 
time E-mail is currently available on AMIS. AFTAC information assurance personnel 
were shown only the x-axis to each value, and not the actual function itself, to reduce the 
chance for bias. 
Figure 4-3 gives the x-axis for 'Percentage of Time E-mail Service is Available' 
as it appeared on the scoring sheet used by AFTAC personnel. 
80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 
Figure 4-3: X-axis of Percentage of time E-mail Service is Available 
AFTAC experts determined that the percentage of time E-mail service was available on 
the current system was 97%. This score was later converted into a value using the 
function shown in Figure 4-2. The scoring process was continued using the same x-axis 
format until all measures in the IAAM model were scored. 
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Table 4-1 shows the score and corresponding value for each measure under the 
Information Assurance hierarchy for the Baseline Case. The top-tier values in the 
hierarchy appear on the left margin of the table, with their respective sub-objectives 
displayed to the right. Note that not all weights in Tables 4-1 through 4-12 sum to 
exactly 1.000 due to rounding. 
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Availability % Email Service Up 
Time (UT) 
0.176 0.011 97 0.880 
% Print Service UT 0.176 0.011 99 0.960 
% File Service UT 0.588 0.037 99 0.960 
% Internet Service 
UT 
0.059 0.004 95 0.800 
Confidentiality Change in 
Confidentiality 
1.000 0.254 No Change 0.500 
Integrity Change in Integrity 1.000 0.190 No Change 0.500 
Compliance % Automated 
Compliance 
Procedures 
0.200 0.012 45 0.451 
% Validated 
Compliance 
0.800 0.051 90 0.900 
Detection Timely Physical 
Internal 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.003 2 0.913 
Electronic 
Internal 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.030 3 0.700 
Physical 
External 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.012 4 0.167 
Electronic 
External 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.060 1 0.950 










1.000 0.026 75 0.570 
Flexibility Is System Flexible? 1.000 0.021 Yes 1.000 
Reaction Respond Timely Time to Notify 
Support Personnel 
(SP) 
0.500 0.032 Instantaneous 
Indirect 
0.900 
Time to Correctly 
ID Event 
0.250 0.016 0.750 0.625 
Time to Take 
Proper Action 
0.250 0.016 15 0.750 
Flexible 
Deterrence 
Point at Which 
Event Isolated 
1.000 0.006 Single 
Server 
0.150 
Verify Did SP Detect, ID, 
Act Properly? 
1.000 0.016 Yes 1.000 
Restore Timely Time to Restore 
Full Infrastructure 
0.500 0.005 1.500 0.625 
Time to Restore 
Data 
0.500 0.005 2.500 0.250 
Accurately % Recoverable 
Information 
1.000 0.032 90 0.417 
Adapt / Learn Ability ofSP to 
Teach System 
0.143 0.002 Partially 
Taught 
0.500 
Ability of System to 
Teach Itself 




Overall, the baseline system scored well in the Information Assurance hierarchy 
receiving a 0.618 out of a possible 1.000. Again, this score is the global weight of each 
measure multiplied by its associated value, summed across all measures in the hierarchy. 
The present AMIS system scored well in Availability, where all four measures scored a 
0.800 or higher, and Time to Detect Electronic External Events, which received a score 
of 0.950. Flexibility and Verify both received perfect scores of 1.000, although these 
measures are weighted significantly less than Availability or Time to Detect Electronic 
External Events. 
It is apparent that several values in the Baseline Case offer potential for 
improvement. Six of the twenty-five measures scored below a 0.500 out of a possible 
1.000: Percentage of Automated Compliance Procedures (0.450), Time to Detect 
Physical External Events (0.167), Point at which Event is Isolated (0.150), Time to 
Restore Data (0.250), Percentage of Recoverable Information (0.417), and Ability of 
System to Teach Itself (0.000). It should be noted that the Baseline Case also scored 
moderately in Confidentiality and Integrity, each receiving a 0.500. Since these values 
were measured in relation to the Baseline Case, the Baseline Case itself must receive a 
'No Change.' Since Confidentiality and Integrity were the highest weighted measures in 
the IA hierarchy, with global weights of 0.254 and 0.190 respectively, the effect to the 
overall IA score was pronounced. 
The Baseline Case was also scored against the Impact of IA on System 
Operational Capability (IOC) and Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC) models. Since 
the IOC hierarchy measured the impact implementing new IA strategies would have on 
current system operational capability, many of the values scored 'No Change.' This is by 
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design, since there will be no impact on the current system if no IA strategies are 
implemented. Values that were not measured as a change to the Baseline system were 
scored to represent the system in its original state. For example, AFT AC experts 
determined that the usage of current system hardware and software is widespread, 
therefore the system components were considered to be an 'Industry Standard.' Table 
4-2 records the score and corresponding value for each measure under the IOC hierarchy 
for the Baseline Case: 










Efficiency Ability to Process Users Change in 
User 
Throughput 
1.000 0.049 No 
Change 
0.600 
Impact on System Overhead Change in 
System 
Capacity 
1.000 0.198 No 
Change 
0.600 
Functionality Missions Enabled Did Strategy 
Enable New 
Mission? 
1.000 0.030 No 0.000 
Availability Change in 
Availability 
1.000 0.243 No 
Change 
0.900 
Compatibility Degree of 
Difficulty 
1.000 0.122 Simple 0.900 
Convenience Accessibility Change in 
Accessibility 
1.000 0.055 No 
Change 
0.500 
Complexity User Change in 
User 
Complexity 






Change in SP 
Complexity 





Time to Implement and Test Software 0.615 0.012 2 0.800 
Hardware 0.308 0.006 2 0.600 
Physical 0.077 0.002 4 0.000 
Usage History Exposure in 
Similar 
Industry 
0.200 0.006 Industry 
Standard 
1.000 
SP Experience 0.800 0.024 Moderate 
Experience 
0.550 
Flexibility Upgradeability Can System be 
Upgraded? 
1.000 0.031 Yes 1.000 
Expandability Can System be 
Expanded? 
1.000 0.031 Yes 1.000 
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The AMIS Baseline Case received a score of 0.698 in the IOC hierarchy. AMIS 
currently scores well in 'Time to Implement and Test Software' (0.800), fair in 'Time to 
Implement and Test Hardware' (0.600), and poor in 'Time to Implement Physical 
Strategies' (0.000). Although 'Time to Implement Physical Strategies' has a global 
weight of only 0.002, it is an area for improvement. It should be noted, however, that it 
is an area beyond AFTAC's direct control. The Baseline Case uses 'Industry Standard' 
IA strategies, and therefore received a score of 1.000 on the 'Exposure in Similar 
Industry' measure. Improvement could be made in 'Support Personnel Experience with 
the IA Strategies' however, as this measure received a value score of only a 0.550. All 
other measures in this hierarchy were designed to capture changes in AFTAC IA 
strategies, and therefore the Baseline Case scores a 'No Change' in these measures. It is 
important to note that a score of 'No Change,' in relation to system operational 
capability, is a desirable score since most IA strategies tend to decrease operational 
capabilities. 
With respect to the Baseline Case, the Impact of IA on Resource Costs model was 
used to determine the fiscal cost and cost of personnel time. For example, AFTAC cost 
experts determined that current IA strategies cost approximately $100,000 per year. That 
number is used as the baseline for the 'Average Cost per Year' measure. Table 4-3 
presents the score and corresponding value for each measure under the IRC hierarchy for 
the Baseline Case: 
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0.333 0.133 0 1.000 
Physical 
Construction 
0.333 0.133 0 1.000 
Recurring Normalized 
Cost per Year 
0.333 0.133 100000 0.500 
Personnel User Time Needed 
to Learn IA 
Strategy 




Time Initial Time to 
Train SP 
0.143 0.001 5 0.600 
Frequency of 
Training 




0.286 0.003 0.250 0.950 
Number % Change in 
SP Needed 
1.000 0.045 0.000 0.700 
The Baseline Case scored only a 0.425 in the IRC hierarchy. This low overall 
IRC score is due, in part, to the undesirable score (0.100) the current AMIS configuration 
received in User 'Time to Learn IA Strategy.' Since this measure is weighted at 0.545, 
even a slight improvement in this area would produce a material increase in IRC to 
AFTAC. 
Since the current AMIS configuration has been paid for, and as such is a sunk 
cost, there is no initial cost to AFTAC to keep the system in its present state. For this 
reason, the initial costs for 'Computer System' and 'Physical Construction' both received 
scores of 1.000. 
After the Baseline Case was scored, three different information assurance 
alternatives were scored. These alternatives were IA strategies that were under 
consideration for implementation on AMIS at the time of this study. When applicable, 
each measure received a Most Likely Case score, a Best Case score, and a Worst Case 
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score since AFT AC experts were predicting how the system would perform if the 
strategy were implemented, rather than rating the strategy after implementation. The 
three strategies considered were Internet Security Scanner (ISS), Enterprise Security 
Manager (ESM), and Cisco Secure Intrusion Detection System (IDS). It is important to 
note that these strategies are not necessarily competing with each other; each performs a 
specific and independent function and thus all three could be implemented 
simultaneously. They are individually evaluated in the following sections to illustrate 
how the analysis model can be used. 
4.2 Internet Security Scanner (ISS) - Most Likely Case 
The Internet Security Scanner is a vulnerability scanner manufactured by Internet 
Security Systems, Inc. This product would provide AFT AC with the ability to 
Scan network communication services, operating systems, routers, e-mail 
and Web servers, firewalls, and applications, thereby identifying system 
weaknesses which could result in unauthorized network access [ISS, 
2001]. 
Table 4-4 details the scores assigned by AFTAC experts based on the Most Likely results 
from implementing ISS, along with the corresponding value for each measure. 
A summary of the Worst Case and Best Case conditions for all alternatives will 
follow sequentially after the Most Likely Case for each strategy has been presented. It 
should be noted that all reported scores for ISS, ESM, and Cisco Secure IDS in this 
section reflect the strategy's contribution to the existing AMIS configuration. The scores 
are the expected outcome with that specific strategy implemented on the current system, 
the Baseline Case. 
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Availability % Email Service Up 
Time (UT) 
0.176 0.011 97 0.880 
% Print Service UT 0.176 0.011 99 0.960 
% File Service UT 0.588 0.037 99 0.960 
% Internet Service 
UT 
0.059 0.004 95 0.800 
Confidentiality Change in 
Confidentiality 
1.000 0.254 Increased 0.750 
Integrity Change in Integrity 1.000 0.190 Increased 0.800 
Compliance % Automated 
Compliance 
Procedures 
0.200 0.012 60 0.601 
% Validated 
Compliance 
0.800 0.051 90 0.900 
Detection Timely Physical 
Internal 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.003 2 0.913 
Electronic 
Internal 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.030 3 0.700 
Physical 
External 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.012 4 0.167 
Electronic 
External 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.060 1 0.950 










1.000 0.026 75 0.570 
Flexibility Is System Flexible? 1.000 0.021 Yes 1.000 
Reaction Respond Timely Time to Notify 
Support Personnel 
(SP) 
0.500 0.032 Instantaneous 
Indirect 
0.900 
Time to Correctly 
ID Event 
0.250 0.016 0.750 0.625 
Time to Take 
Proper Action 
0.250 0.016 15 0.750 
Flexible 
Deterrence 
Point at Which 
Event Isolated 
1.000 0.006 Single 
Server 
0.150 
Verify Did SP Detect, ID, 
Act Properly? 
1.000 0.016 Yes 1.000 
Restore Timely Time to Restore 
Full Infrastructure 
0.500 0.005 1.500 0.625 
Time to Restore 
Data 
0.500 0.005 2.500 0.250 
Accurately % Recoverable 
Information 
1.000 0.032 90 0.417 
Adapt / Learn Ability ofSP to 
Teach System 
0.143 0.002 Fully 
Taught 
1.000 
Ability of System to 
Teach Itself 




AMIS, with the ISS strategy implemented, received an overall score of 0.753 in 
the IA hierarchy. The reason for the material change over the Baseline Case comes 
mainly from the Confidentiality and Integrity measures, where ISS received 0.750 and 
0.800 respectively. Recall that these measures account for 44.4% of the total possible IA 
score; therefore any positive change from the Baseline Case results in substantial 
improvement. With ISS, the number of measures that scored below a 0.500 was reduced 
to four, with room for improvement still existing in 'Time to Detect Physical External 
Events,' 'Point at which Event can be Isolated,' 'Time to Restore Data,' and 'Percentage 
of Recoverable Information.' 
The impact to system operational capability caused by installing ISS was 
considered next. Again, AFT AC experts were asked to score the Most Likely Case, the 
Best Case, and the Worst Case when applicable. The results for the Most Likely Case are 
presented in Table 4-5. The IOC hierarchy measures the impact installing an IA strategy 
will have on the system; all scores are therefore in relation to the Baseline Case presented 
above. 
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Efficiency Ability to Process Users Change in 
User 
Throughput 
1.000 0.049 No 
Change 
0.600 
Impact on System Overhead Change in 
System 
Capacity 
1.000 0.198 Decrease 0.200 
Functionality Missions Enabled Did Strategy 
Enable New 
Mission? 
1.000 0.030 No 0.000 
Availability Change in 
Availability 
1.000 0.243 No 
Change 
0.900 
Compatibility Degree of 
Difficulty 
1.000 0.122 Simple 0.900 
Convenience Accessibility Change in 
Accessibility 
1.000 0.055 No 
Change 
0.500 
Complexity User Change in 
User 
Complexity 






Change in SP 
Complexity 





Time to Implement and Test Software 0.615 0.012 2 0.800 
Hardware 0.308 0.006 2 0.600 
Physical 0.077 0.002 4 0.000 
Usage History Exposure in 
Similar 
Industry 
0.200 0.006 Industry 
Standard 
1.000 
SP Experience 0.800 0.024 Minimal 
Experience 
0.100 
Flexibility Upgradeability Can System be 
Upgraded? 
1.000 0.031 Yes 1.000 
Expandability Can System be 
Expanded? 
1.000 0.031 Yes 1.000 
ISS received an overall score of 0.597 in the IOC hierarchy. The strategy scored 
poorly since personnel believed it would decrease 'System Capacity,' moderately 
increase 'Support Personnel Complexity,' and because most personnel had limited 
experience with the product, 'Support Personnel Experience' would also decrease. 
Combined, these three measures account for about 26% of the total IOC score possible. 
ISS did not improve over the Baseline Case in any measure in the IOC hierarchy. 
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Table 4-6 details the impact ISS will have on AFTAC's resource costs. There is 
no initial cost to purchase ISS since this product can be licensed from Internet Security 
Systems, Inc. free of charge to AFTAC. However, it will require initial training for 
AFT AC personnel. Therefore, the cost to train personnel (the majority of which is travel 
costs) is considered under initial computer systems purchase for all alternatives. Since 
the objective is to measure the impact on AFTAC resources, all costs were added to the 
Baseline Case for each alternative. Table 4-6 shows the measure score and 
corresponding value for the IRC hierarchy for the ISS Most Likely Case. 















0.333 0.133 0.010 0.990 
Physical 
Construction 
0.333 0.133 0.000 1.000 
Recurring Normalized 
Cost per Year 
0.333 0.133 105000 0.475 
Personnel User Time Needed 
to Learn IA 
Strategy 




Time Initial Time to 
Train SP 
0.143 0.001 7 0.460 
Frequency of 
Training 




0.286 0.003 0.250 0.950 
Number % Change in 
SP Needed 
1.000 0.045 5 0.400 
ISS received a score of 0.407 in the IRC hierarchy. Although ISS is relatively 
inexpensive to maintain, it nonetheless scores worse than the Baseline Case since it is 
slightly more expensive than maintaining the current system. AFTAC personnel can also 
expect additional training to learn ISS, which also contributed to lowering ISS's overall 
IRC score. 
76 
While ISS will improve AMIS information assurance, it will do it at a cost to 
system operational capability and AFT AC resources. 
4.3 Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) - Most Likely Case 
The Enterprise Security Manager is an Air Force wide information assurance 
product that is provided at the base level. ESM was formerly manufactured by AXENT 
Technologies, who merged with the Symantec Corporation, the current product provider. 
ESM grants the 
ability to automate the planning, management and control of security 
policy from a single location, thereby saving time and money. [It] does 
this by giving the ability to offload the repetitive and redundant tasks 
associated with managing such a policy to computers rather than relying 
on human staff members [Symantec, 2000]. 
AFTAC information assurance specialists were again asked to score ESM on the Most 
Likely Case, the Best Case, and the Worst Case. The Most Likely information assurance 
provided by the Enterprise Security Manager on AMIS, as determined by AFTAC 
experts, is shown in Table 4-7. A summary of the results from the Worst and Best Cases 
will follow after the Most Likely Cases have been presented for each strategy. 
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Availability % Email Service Up 
Time (UT) 
0.176 0.011 97 0.880 
% Print Service UT 0.176 0.011 99 0.960 
% File Service UT 0.588 0.037 99 0.960 
% Internet Service 
UT 
0.059 0.004 95 0.800 
Confidentiality Change in 
Confidentiality 
1.000 0.254 No Change 0.500 
Integrity Change in Integrity 1.000 0.190 Increased 0.800 
Compliance % Automated 
Compliance 
Procedures 
0.200 0.012 80 0.801 
% Validated 
Compliance 
0.800 0.051 95 0.950 
Detection Timely Physical 
Internal 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.003 2 0.913 
Electronic 
Internal 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.030 3 0.700 
Physical 
External 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.012 4 0.167 
Electronic 
External 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.060 1 0.950 










1.000 0.026 75 0.570 
Flexibility Is System Flexible? 1.00 0.021 Yes 1.000 
Reaction Respond Timely Time to Notify 
Support Personnel 
(SP) 
0.500 0.032 Instantaneous 
Indirect 
0.900 
Time to Correctly 
ID Event 
0.250 0.016 0.750 0.625 
Time to Take 
Proper Action 
0.250 0.016 15 0.750 
Flexible 
Deterrence 
Point at Which 
Event Isolated 
1.000 0.006 Single 
Server 
0.150 
Verify Did SP Detect, ID, 
Act Properly? 
1.000 0.016 Yes 1.000 
Restore Timely Time to Restore 
Full Infrastructure 
0.500 0.005 1.500 0.625 
Time to Restore 
Data 
0.500 0.005 2.500 0.250 
Accurately % Recoverable 
Information 
1.000 0.032 90 0.417 
Adapt / Learn Ability ofSP to 
Teach System 
0.143 0.002 Partially 
Taught 
0.500 
Ability of System to 
Teach Itself 




The ESM strategy scored a 0.683 in the Information Assurance hierarchy, a slight 
increase over the current system. Part of the reason ESM scored relatively low was that 
AFT AC personnel believed it would not increase 'Confidentiality,' the single highest 
weighted measure in the IA hierarchy. ESM is designed to improve system compliance, 
where it received high scores in both 'Percentage of Automated Compliance Procedures' 
and 'Percentage of Validated Compliance' measures. However, 'Compliance' was not as 
heavily weighted. ESM's highly concentrated contribution to IA in Compliance did not 
have as material an impact as the other strategies. 
The most likely projected impact ESM will have on system operational capability 
is shown in Table 4-8: 
79 










Efficiency Ability to Process Users Change in 
User 
Throughput 
1.000 0.049 Decrease 0.200 
Impact on System Overhead Change in 
System 
Capacity 
1.000 0.198 No 
Change 
0.600 
Functionality Missions Enabled Did Strategy 
Enable New 
Mission? 
1.000 0.030 No 0.000 
Availability Change in 
Availability 
1.000 0.243 No 
Change 
0.900 
Compatibility Degree of 
Difficulty 
1.000 0.122 Simple 0.900 
Convenience Accessibility Change in 
Accessibility 
1.000 0.055 No 
Change 
0.500 
Complexity User Change in 
User 
Complexity 






Change in SP 
Complexity 





Time to Implement and Test Software 0.615 0.012 4 0.500 
Hardware 0.308 0.006 2 0.600 
Physical 0.077 0.002 4 0.000 
Usage History Exposure in 
Similar 
Industry 
0.200 0.006 Industry 
Standard 
1.000 
SP Experience 0.800 0.024 Minimal 
Experience 
0.100 
Flexibility Upgradeability Can System be 
Upgraded? 
1.000 0.031 Yes 1.000 
Expandability Can System be 
Expanded? 
1.000 0.031 Yes 1.000 
ESM received an overall IOC score of 0.658. ESM decreased overall IOC 
because AFT AC experts believed it would slightly decrease 'User Throughput' and 
minimally increase 'Support Personnel Complexity.' ESM scored exactly as the Baseline 
Case in all other measures. The impact ESM is projected to have on AFTAC resources is 
shown in Table 4-9: 
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0.333 0.133 0.010 0.990 
Physical 
Construction 
0.333 0.133 0.000 1.000 
Recurring Normalized 
Cost per Year 
0.333 0.133 105000 0.475 
Personnel User Time Needed 
to Learn IA 
Strategy 




Time Initial Time to 
Train SP 
0.143 0.001 6 0.530 
Frequency of 
Training 




0.286 0.003 0.250 0.950 
Number % Change in 
SP Needed 
1.000 0.045 -5 0.800 
ESM scored the same as the Baseline system in the IRC hierarchy, with a score of 
0.425, implying that the strategy will not add to current AMIS resource costs. The need 
for improvement in the User 'Time Needed to Learn an IA Strategy' measure remains. 
ESM is expected to add information assurance to AMIS, while decreasing its operational 
capability, and leaving resource costs unaffected when the Most Likely Case is 
considered. 
4.4 Cisco Secure Intrusion Detection System (IDS) - Most Likely Case 
Formerly known as Cisco NetRanger, the Cisco Secure IDS is a hardware / 
software intrusion detection device "designed to detect, report, and terminate 
unauthorized activity throughout a network" [Cisco, 2000]. Table 4-10 presents the most 
likely projected information assurance results for the Cisco Secure IDS strategy. 
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Table 4-10: Scores anc corresponding values for each measure in the IA hierarchy - Cisco Secure IDS 













Availability % Email Service Up 
Time (UT) 
0.176 0.011 97 0.880 
% Print Service UT 0.176 0.011 99 0.960 
% File Service UT 0.588 0.037 99 0.960 
% Internet Service UT 0.059 0.004 95 0.800 
Confidentiality Change in 
Confidentiality 
1.000 0.254 Greatly 
Increased 
1.000 
Integrity Change in Integrity 1.000 0.190 Greatly 
Increased 
1.000 
Compliance % Automated 
Compliance 
Procedures 
0.200 0.012 45 0.451 
% Validated 
Compliance 
0.800 0.051 90 0.900 
Detection Timely Physical 
Internal 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.003 2 0.913 
Electronic 
Internal 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.030 3 0.700 
Physical 
External 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.012 4 0.167 
Electronic 
External 
Time to Detect 1.000 0.060 0.5 0.975 










1.000 0.026 90 0.828 
Flexibility Is System Flexible? 1.000 0.021 Yes 1.000 
Reaction Respond Timely Time to Notify Support 
Personnel (SP) 
0.500 0.032 Instantaneous 
Direct 
1.000 
Time to Correctly ID 
Event 
0.250 0.016 0.75 0.625 
Time to Take Proper 
Action 
0.250 0.016 15 0.750 
Flexible 
Deterrence 
Point at Which Event 
Isolated 
1.000 0.006 Single 
Service 
0.750 
Verify Did SP Detect, ID, Act 
Properly? 
1.000 0.016 Yes 1.000 
Restore Timely Time to Restore Full 
Infrastructure 
0.500 0.005 1.5 0.625 
Time to Restore Data 0.500 0.005 2.5 0.250 
Accurately % Recoverable 
Information 
1.000 0.032 90 0.417 
Adapt / Learn Ability ofSP to Teach 
System 
0.143 0.002 Fully Taught 1.000 
Ability of System to 
Teach Itself 




Cisco Secure IDS scored very well in the Information Assurance hierarchy, 
improving the overall score to a 0.910. The reason Cisco Secure IDS scored well in the 
IA hierarchy was because it is expected to greatly increase both 'Confidentiality' and 
'Integrity.' Receiving a score of 1.000 in each of these measures results in Cisco Secure 
IDS scoring at least 0.222 higher than the Baseline in their respective overall IA scores. 
The strategy also has the ability to adapt with personnel help, notify support personnel 
instantaneously and directly during an event, and scores the same or better in all 
measures in relation to the Baseline Case. 
The Cisco Secure IDS was then scored to determine its impact on system 
operational capability, as shown in Table 4-11: 
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Table 4-11: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in 
Cisco Secure IDS Most Likely Case 










Efficiency Ability to Process Users Change in 
User 
Throughput 
1.000 0.049 No 
Change 
0.600 
Impact on System Overhead Change in 
System 
Capacity 
1.000 0.198 No 
Change 
0.600 
Functionality Missions Enabled Did Strategy 
Enable New 
Mission? 
1.000 0.030 No 0.000 
Availability Change in 
Availability 
1.000 0.243 Increase 0.950 
Compatibility Degree of 
Difficulty 
1.000 0.122 Moderate 0.600 
Convenience Accessibility Change in 
Accessibility 
1.000 0.055 No 
Change 
0.500 
Complexity User Change in 
User 
Complexity 






Change in SP 
Complexity 





Time to Implement and Test Software 0.615 0.012 2 0.800 
Hardware 0.308 0.006 2 0.600 
Physical 0.077 0.002 4 0.000 
Usage History Exposure in 
Similar 
Industry 
0.200 0.006 Industry 
Standard 
1.000 
SP Experience 0.800 0.024 Minimal 
Experience 
0.100 
Flexibility Upgradeability Can System be 
Upgraded? 
1.000 0.031 Yes 1.000 
Expandability Can System be 
Expanded? 
1.000 0.031 Yes 1.000 
Although Cisco Secure IDS received the highest IA score, it did not fair as well in 
IOC, earning a score of a 0.651. It scored lower than the Baseline Case in several 
measures, taking its most severe decrease in Compatibility's sub-value 'Degree of 
Difficulty.' It improved upon the Baseline Case in Availability, which helped its IOC 
score since this measure carried a weight of 0.243. 
The projected impact of installing Cisco Secure IDS would have on AFTAC 
resources is captured in Table 4-12: 
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Table 4-12: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in the IRC hierarchy - 















0.333 0.133 0.050 0.950 
Physical 
Construction 
0.333 0.133 0.000 1.000 
Recurring Normalized 
Cost per Year 
0.333 0.133 100000 0.500 
Personnel User Time Needed 
to Learn IA 
Strategy 




Time Initial Time to 
Train SP 
0.143 0.001 15 0.100 
Frequency of 
Training 




0.286 0.003 0.250 0.950 
Number % Change in 
SP Needed 
1.000 0.045 10 0.100 
When compared on costs alone, the Cisco Secure IDS strategy is not cost- 
effective, receiving a score of only 0.391. The strategy's high cost results from its impact 
on AFTAC Personnel. The User 'Time Needed to Learn an IA Strategy,' 'Initial Time to 
Train Support Personnel,' and 'Percentage Change in Support Personnel Needed' all 
scored only a 0.100. Like the other alternatives, the strategy would cost AFTAC a 
minimal amount of fiscal resources. 
Cisco Secure IDS greatly improves the information assurance of AMIS, however 
it does it at a marginal cost to both system operational capability and AFTAC resources. 
4.5 Alternative Comparisons - Most Likely Case 
While ISS, ESM, and Cisco Secure IDS could be implemented simultaneously, it 
is important to determine which alternative would provide the most information 
assurance to AFTAC. The alternative that ranks highest in each hierarchy will provide 
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the most benefit to the decision-maker for that particular hierarchy. If an alternative 
ranks above another in one or more hierarchies and the same as another alternative in the 
remaining hierarchies, then it is said to dominate that alternative. Table 4-13 ranks each 
alternative with respect to the Information Assurance hierarchy, with the top tier values 
Information and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction included. The score ofthat 
strategy within the given sub-hierarchy is given in parentheses. 
Table 4-13: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IA - Most Likely Case 
Alternative Information and 
IS Protection 
(max = 0.571) 
Detection 
(max = 0.286) 
Reaction 
(max = 0.143) 
Overall Information 
Assurance Score 
(max = 1.00) 
Baseline 4 (0.333) tie-2 (0.199) tie - 3 (0.086) 4(0.618) 
ISS Most Likely 2 (0.456) tie-2 (0.199) 2 (0.098) 2 (0.753) 
ESM Most Likely 3 (0.397) tie-2 (0.199) tie-3 (0.086) 3 (0.683) 
Cisco Secure IDS 
Most Likely 
1 (0.555) 1 (0.250) 1 (0.105) 1 (0.910) 
Table 4-13 shows that with respect to Information Assurance alone, Cisco Secure 
IDS Most Likely outcome dominates all other alternatives. Clearly, Cisco Secure IDS 
will provide AMIS with the highest level of information assurance among the alternatives 
evaluated, scoring 0.910 out of a possible 1.000. ISS and ESM will each also increase 
the current level of information assurance on AMIS, although to a lesser degree than 
Cisco Secure IDS. 
Figure 4-4 is a graphical representation of Table 4-13. The Best Possible Case is 
displayed at the top of Figure 4-4 to illustrate the maximum possible attainable score in 
Information and IS Protection, Detection, Reaction, and Overall Information Assurance. 
The chart shows Cisco Secure IDS does substantially better than the other alternatives in 
Information and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction, resulting in it being the 
overwhelming choice for best IA strategy. 
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Figure 4-4: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IA - Most Likely Case 
However, information assurance is only one part of the Information Assurance 
Analysis Model (IAAM). Table 4-14 shows the alternative rankings for the Impact of IA 
on System Operational Capability Model, again with the top tier values shown: 
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Not surprisingly, the Baseline Case is the preferred alternative when considering the 
impact IA strategies will have on system operational capability. Each additional strategy 
was measured based on its impact or change to the current state. The Cisco Secure IDS 
Most Likely alternative, which was clearly the best alternative with respect to 
information assurance alone, scored only slightly lower (0.658 to 0.651) than the ESM 
Most Likely Case in overall IRC. Figure 4-5 is a graphical representation of Table 4-14. 
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Figure 4-5: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IOC - Most Likely Case 
Figure 4-5 shows that Cisco Secure IDS was higher than ESM in Efficiency (by 
0.020), slightly lower than ESM in Functionality (by 0.024), and virtually even in 
Convenience, Ease of Implementation, and Flexibility. 
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Table 4-15 presents the results of the four alternatives with respect to the Impact 
of Information Assurance on Resource Costs hierarchy, with the respective rank again 
parenthesized: 
Table 4-15: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IRC - Most Likely Case 
Alternative Life Cycle Acquisition 
Costs (max = 0.40) 
Personnel 
(max = 0.60) 
Overall IRC Score 
(max = 1.00) 
Baseline 1 (0.333) 2 (0.092) Tie-1(0.425) 
ISS Most Likely tie-2 (0.329) 3 (0.078) 3 (0.407) 
ESM Most Likely tie-2 (0.329) 1 (0.097) Tie -1 (0.425) 
Cisco Secure IDS 
Most Likely 
4 (0.327) 4 (0.064) 4(0.391) 
The Baseline Case and ESM Most Likely tie as the top alternative with respect to 
the Impact of an IA on AFTAC Resource Costs hierarchy. Table 4-15 shows that while 
the Baseline is less expensive to maintain (hence the higher value), the ESM Most Likely 
alternative requires less personnel. It should be noted that the maximum value possible 
for Personnel is 0.600 yet no alternative reached 0.100. This is clearly a value gap in the 
set of alternatives. Developing a new alternative that could produce a high score on the 
Personnel value would greatly improve the overall IRC score. A graphical representation 
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Figure 4-6: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IRC - Most Likely Case 
Table 4-16 gives a summary of the alternatives and their respective rank within 
each hierarchy. No alternative dominated another. 
Table 4-16: Summary of Alternative Rankings - Most Likely Case 
Alternative Information 
Assurance Rank 
IOC Rank IRC Rank 
Baseline 4 1 1 
ISS Most Likely 2 4 3 
ESM Most Likely 3 2 1 
Cisco Secure IDS Most 
Likely 
1 3 4 
Figure 4-7 presents the Most Likely strategy results on the three IAAM 
hierarchies. Again note that Cisco Secure IDS is clearly the best alternative with respect 
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Figure 4-7: Most Likely Case Results, Separated by IAAM Hierarchy 
Presented with these alternatives, the decision-maker(s) could now consider the 
relative merits of each alternative given their scores in each of the three hierarchies. As 
was seen in the preceding analysis, the total measures can be "peeled-back" to any level 
of the hierarchy to reveal the sources of the differences. The decision-maker's values can 
help clarify differences in the alternatives and allow him or her to use their expertise to 
make the final selections. The associated analysis is available to support the decision- 
maker's expertise. 
A summary of the Most Likely conditions is given as a radar chart in Figure 4-8. 
Each axis of the chart represents one of the hierarchies in the IAAM. The higher a 
strategy scores in any given hierarchy, the further out its representative line will be on 
that specific axis. This chart shows that Cisco Secure IDS is the clear winner in the 
Information Assurance hierarchy. The strategies are tightly grouped in both the IRC and 
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IRC hierarchies, indicating that the Cisco Secure IDS would not substantially change 
system operational capability or consume large amounts of AFTAC resources. It has 
been shown, however, that Cisco Secure IDS is slightly outperformed in IOC and IRC. 
The decision-maker will need to consider the relative merits of each value when making a 
final decision. 
Overall IRC v 








— ISS Most Likely 
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-■-Cisco Secure IDS 
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v Overall IOC 
Figure 4-8: Radar Chart on Most Likely Case Results 
4.6 Worst and Best Case Comparisons 
While the analysis of the Most Likely Case provided insight, it is important to 
consider potential "downside" risk and "upside" gains since the information assurance 
strategies may not perform exactly as specified. For this reason, the Internet Security 
Scanner, Enterprise Security Manager, and Cisco Secure IDS were also scored on a 
Worst Case and a Best Case conditions for each appropriate measure. Any measure that 
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AFT AC personnel felt would not vary was left as it was originally scored. A summary of 
the results from the Worst and Base Case conditions is presented in the following 
sections. 
4.6.1 Alternative Comparisons - Worst Case Conditions 
The Worst Case conditions for each alternative and the Baseline are summarized 
in the following tables. Since AFT AC personnel cannot select whether a strategy 
performs as expected, the Worst Case conditions are only compared to one another. The 
Baseline Case, which did not change, is provided as a reference. Table 4-17 provides the 
score and associated rank for each Worst Case alternative with respect to the Information 
Assurance hierarchy, with Information and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction 
separated: 
Table 4-17: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IA - Worst Case 
Alternative Information and 
IS Protection 
(max = 0.571) 
Detection 
(max = 0.286) 
Reaction 
(max = 0.143) 
Overall Information 
Assurance Score 
(max = 1.00) 
Baseline 4 (0.333) tie-2 (0.199) tie-3 (0.086) 4(0.618) 
ISS Worst Case 3 (0.334) tie-2 (0.199) 2 (0.098) 2(0.631) 
ESM Worst Case 2 (0.336) tie-2 (0.199) tie-3 (0.086) 3 (0.622) 
Cisco Secure IDS 
Worst Case 
1 (0.555) 1 (0.250) 1 (0.105) 1 (0.910) 
The Cisco Secure IDS Worst Case is the same as its Most Likely Case with respect to 
Information Assurance. Since there is no variation for Cisco Secure IDS on IA, and it 
was the highest ranked alternative with respect to the Most Likely outcome, it is 
guaranteed to produce the highest amount of assurance of any alternative. Figure 4-9 is a 
graphical representation of Table 4-17. 
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Figure 4-9: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IA - Worst Case 
In the Worst Case conditions, ISS and ESM lose substantial value in Information 
and IS Protection, while Cisco Secure IDS is able to maintain its Most Likely score. 
Table 4-18 summarizes the rankings with respect to the IOC model: 
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(0.148) 
2 (0.304) tie-3 
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2 (0.020) tie-1 
(0.062) 
2 (0.650) 
Table 4-18 shows that if the Worst Case conditions occurred for every alternative, Cisco 
Secure IDS would improve to second best behind only the Baseline Case. If the Worst 
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Case occurred for ISS, AFATC would experience a severe loss in system operational 
capability. Figure 4-10 is a graphical representation of Table 4-18: 
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Figure 4-10: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IOC - Worst Case 
ISS scores significantly lower in the IOC Worst Case conditions than ESM and 
Cisco Secure IDS, which implies there is a chance ISS could have a negative impact on 
system operational capability. The final hierarchy in the IAAM model, the Impact of 
Information Assurance on Resource Costs, is summarized as Table 4-19: 
Table 4-19: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IRC - Worst Case 
Alternative Life Cycle Acquisition 
Costs (max = 0.40) 
Personnel 
(max = 0.60) 
Overall IRC Score 
(max = 1.00) 
Baseline 1 (0.333) 2 (0.092) 1 (0.425) 
ISS Worst Case tie-3 (0.324) 3 (0.065) 3 (0.389) 
ESM Worst Case tie - 3 (0.324) 1 (0.097) 2 (0.421) 
Cisco Secure IDS 
Worst Case 
2 (0.327) 4(0.061) 4 (0.388) 
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The Baseline Case edges ESM for the highest value in the IRC model, although as 
previously mentioned, differences this small may not be material. As a whole, the 
alternatives are grouped fairly tightly. This is due primarily because their collective low 
implementation and maintenance costs made the value 'Life Cycle Acquisition Costs' 
almost irrelevant to these alternatives. Figure 4-11 is a graphical representation of Table 
4-19 presented above. 
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Figure 4-11: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IRC - Worst Case 
Clearly, Figure 4-11 shows that the Personnel value gap still exists in the Worst Case 
conditions since all strategies still score very low in this measure. A maximum score of 
0.600 may be earned in Personnel, however the highest ranked alternative in Personnel, 
ESM, scores only a 0.097. 
Table 4-20 summarizes the Worst Case conditions alternative's respective rank 
within each hierarchy: 
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Table 4-20: Worst Case Conditions Alternative Rankings 
Alternative Information 
Assurance Rank 
IOC Rank IRC Rank 
Baseline 4 1 1 
ISS Most Likely 2 4 3 
ESM Most Likely 3 3 2 
Cisco Secure IDS Most 
Likely 
1 2 3 
Figure 4-12 shows each strategy's respective score in the IA, IOC, and IRC hierarchies 
for the Worst Case conditions. Notice that there is more variation in the IOC hierarchy 
than there was in the Most Likely Case due to the low score of ISS. 
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Figure 4-12: Worst Case Results, Separated by IAAM Hierarchy 
The strategies separate in the IA and IOC hierarchies in the Worst Case 
conditions. Since Cisco Secure IDS had no variation with respect to IA in the Worst 
Case conditions, it kept its original score of 0.910. Cisco Secure IDS greatly 
outperformed the other strategies in the IA hierarchy Worst Case conditions since they all 
scored substantially lower than they did in the Most Likely Case. ISS has larger 
"downside" risk in the IOC hierarchy, implying that AFT AC personnel believe there is a 
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possibility it could materially impact system operational capability if implementation 
were to go worse than expected. 
4.6.2 Alternative Comparisons - Best Case 
The Best Case conditions were scored to capture benefits of the strategy that were 
not initially considered or were uncertain to AFTAC personnel. Again, not all measures 
were believed to vary. Table 4-21 summarizes the Best Case conditions ranking for each 
alternative and the Baseline Case, which is unchanged: 
Table 4-21: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IA - Best Case 
Alternative Information and 
IS Protection 
(max = 0.571) 
Detection 
(max = 0.286) 
Reaction 
(max = 0.143) 
Overall Information 
Assurance Score 
(max = 1.00) 
Baseline 4 (0.333) tie-2 (0.199) tie-3 (0.086) 4(0.618) 
ISS Best Case 1 (0.560) tie-2 (0.199) 2 (0.098) 2 (0.857) 
ESM Best Case 3 (0.465) tie-2 (0.199) tie-3 (0.086) 3 (0.750) 
Cisco Secure IDS 
Best Case 
2 (0.557) 1 (0.250) 1 (0.109) 1 (0.915) 
The Cisco Secure IDS is again the highest ranked alternative within the Best Case 
conditions, scoring 91.5% of the total possible. While the relative improvement is small 
from Cisco Secure IDS's Most Likely score (a gain of 0.005), when added to the current 
AMIS configuration it nonetheless provides the best score on the Best Case conditions. 
In the Best Case, all alternatives separated themselves from the Baseline Case, improving 
their respective scores from the Most Likely Case. Figure 4-13 is a graphical 
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Figure 4-13: Alternative Comparisons with respect to Information Assurance - Best Case 
In the Best Case, ISS actually performs better than Cisco Secure IDS in Information and 
IS Protection. This high score also propelled ISS to a high overall score, but still not high 
enough to overcome Cisco Secure IDS, which scored well throughout the hierarchy. 
Table 4-22 details the rankings of the Best Case conditions alternatives with 
respect to the Impact of IA on System Operational Capability hierarchy: 
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The ESM Best Case conditions actually improve system operational capability as it 
received a higher score than the Baseline Case. This is the only alternative and condition 
set within any of the analyses to actually improve IA and operational capability on the 
system. The Cisco Secure IDS, which was the clear winner in the IA hierarchy, ranks 
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Figure 4-14: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IOC - Best Case 
In the Best Case, ESM scores strongly in Functionality, which is the reason it 
ranks ahead of the Baseline Case in IOC. Cisco Secure IDS received the same scores for 
all values in the IOC hierarchy as did ESM, save Functionality. Cisco Secure IDS scored 
only a 0.304 in Functionality, a relatively low score compared to ESM and ISS. Table 4- 
23 shows the Best Case alternative rankings for the IRC hierarchy: 
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Table 4-23: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IRC - Best Case 
Alternative Life Cycle Acquisition 
Costs (max = 0.40) 
Personnel 
(max = 0.60) 
Overall IRC Score 
(max = 1.00) 
Baseline 1 (0.333) 2 (0.092) 2 (0.425) 
ISS Best Case 2 (0.330) 3 (0.078) 3 (0.408) 
ESM Best Case 3 (0.329) 1 (0.101) 1 (0.430) 
Cisco Secure IDS 
Best Case 
4 (0.327) 4 (0.064) 4(0.391) 
The ESM Best Case conditions again ranks higher than the Baseline Case with respect to 
the IRC hierarchy. Combined with the knowledge from the previous table, ESM Best 
Case can improve IA (although not the level of Cisco Secure IDS), increase operational 
capability, and consume less resource costs than the current system. It is important to 
note, however, that this is under Best Case conditions and should be considered as the 
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Figure 4-15: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IRC - Best Case 
ESM scores higher than any other alternative in Personnel, causing it to be the 
highest ranked strategy in IRC for the Best Case conditions since there was little variation 
in the Life Cycle Acquisition Costs scores. It is important to note that even on Best Case 
conditions, a value gap in Personnel still exists. ESM's relatively high score of 0.101 in 
Personnel is still far from the best possible score of 0.600. Table 4-24 summarizes the 
alternatives' respective ranking within each hierarchy for the Best Case conditions. ESM 
dominated the Baseline Case on the Best Case conditions as it ranks higher in all three 
hierarchies. 
Table 4-24: Summary of Best Case Alternative Rankings 
Alternative Information 
Assurance Rank 
IOC Rank IRC Rank 
Baseline 4 2 2 
ISS Most Likely 2 4 3 
ESM Most Likely 3 1 1 
Cisco Secure IDS Most 
Likely 
1 3 4 
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Figure 4-16 shows the Best Case conditions results for each of the strategies. ISS, ESM, 
and Cisco Secure IDS all score substantially higher in the IA hierarchy. ESM scores 
higher than the Baseline Case in the IA, IOC, and IRC hierarchies, indicating that it 
provides increased information assurance, increased system operational capability, and 
will consume less AFT AC resources than the Baseline Case 
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Figure 4-16: Best Case Results, Separated by IAAM Hierarchy 
Figure 4-17, Figure 4-18, and Figure 4-19 show the range of each strategy with respect to 
the IA, IOC, and IRC hierarchies. Figure 4-17 shows that the Worst Case conditions for 
Cisco Secure IDS receives a higher score than the Best Case for all other alternatives. 
This implies that Cisco Secure IDS is clearly the best strategy with respect to the IA 
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Figure 4-17: Strategy Range with respect to IA 
Figure 4-18 depicts the Worst, Most Likely, and Best Case conditions for the IOC 
hierarchy. There is no single strategy that completely dominates the IOC hierarchy. For 
the Best Case conditions, ESM is the highest ranked alternative; however, for the Worst 
Case conditions it ranks below the Baseline Case and Cisco Secure IDS. ESM 
unfortunately has a wide range between its Best and Worst Case scores. ISS also exhibits 
a large range in the IOC hierarchy, indicating that there is uncertainty with this strategy's 
impact to system operational capability. Cisco Secure IDS exhibited the least variation in 
the IOC hierarchy, ranging from a Worst Case of 0.650 to a Best Case of 0.658. 
Although this is a decrease from the baseline IOC score of 0.689, Cisco Secure IDS does 
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Figure 4-18: Strategy Range with respect to IOC 
Figure 4-19 also shows that there is no guaranteed best alternative in the IRC 
hierarchy. While ESM Best Case edges the Baseline Case for the highest ranked 
alternative, it does not score higher in the Worst Case. ISS and Cisco Secure IDS are 
clearly the third and fourth ranked strategies with respect to IRC, however their ordering 
cannot be guaranteed due to having a slight overlap. Again, Cisco Secure IDS exhibited 
the least variation, however its Most Likely IRC score was lower than that of the Baseline 
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Figure 4-19: Strategy Range with respect to IRC 
4.7 Weight Sensitivity Analysis 
The total value for each alternative depends on the weights given to each 
measure; therefore a sensitivity analysis based on the weighting was performed to 
determine if and when the rank order of the alternatives changed. A sensitivity analysis 
on the weighting of the top-tier values for each of the three hierarchies for the Most 
Likely Case will be presented in this chapter. A sensitivity analysis on all other values 
and individual measures for the Best, Worst, and Most Likely Case was also performed 
but is not presented in this document. The vast majority of lower tier values were 
insensitive to weight changes at the local level. 
One-way sensitivity analyses were performed for each value. The Microsoft 
Excel © spreadsheet used to generate the one-way sensitivity analysis in this report does 
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have the ability to produce two or three-way sensitivity analysis should that be desired, 
although additional programming is required. 
The sensitivity analysis will show if altering any weights would change the 
overall ranking of the alternatives in the given hierarchy. All sensitivity analyses are 
one-way, meaning that only one value at a time was varied independently. All other 
values at the same tier of the hierarchy kept their respective proportional weight ratios. 
For example, when performing a sensitivity analysis on the top tier values of the IA 
hierarchy, which are Information and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction, only one 
value at a time was varied from 0.000 to 1.000 (at increments of 0.100) while the other 
two values held their original weight ratios. The local weights for Information and IS 
Protection originally were 4 / 7 (= 0.571), 2 / 7 (= 0.286), and 1 / 7 (= 0.143) respectively. 
As the weight for Information and IS Protection was varied, all three weights were still 
forced to sum to 1.000. 
The formula used to determine the weights for the dependant values, Detection 
and Reaction, are given as Equation 4-1 and Equation 4-2 respectively, where wp = 
Information and IS Protection weight, w<i = Detection weight, Wd° = Original Detection 
weight, wr = Reaction weight, and wr° = Original Reaction weight: 
Wd = (1 - wp) x [wd° / (wd° + wr
0)] 
Equation 4-1: Formula to calculate Detection while varying Information and IS Protection [modified from 
Kirkwood, 1997: 82] 
Wr = (1 - Wp) X [Wr° / (Wr° + Wd°)] 
Equation 4-2: Formula to calculate Reaction while varying Information and IS Protection [modified from 
Kirkwood, 1997: 82] 
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Table 4-25 shows the respective weights for Information and IS Protection, 
Detection, and Reaction as Information and IS Protection is varied from 0.000 to 1.000 
(original weights in bold): 





0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.571 0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900 1.000 
Detection 0.667 0.600 0.533 0.467 0.400 0.333 0.286 0.267 0.200 0.133 0.067 0.000 
Reaction 0.333 0.300 0.267 0.233 0.200 0.167 0.143 0.133 0.100 0.067 0.033 0.000 
Detection was then varied at increments of 0.100 holding Information and IS 
Protection and Reaction to their original comparative weight ratios. Table 4-26 presents 
the weights for Information and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction as Detection was 
varied (original weights in bold): 
Table 4-26: Weights as Detection is varied from 0.000 to 1.000 
Value Weight 




0.800 0.720 0.640 0.571 0.560 0.480 0.400 0.320 0.240 0.160 0.080 0.000 
Reaction 0.200 0.180 0.160 0.143 0.140 0.120 0.100 0.080 0.060 0.040 0.020 0.000 
Finally, Reaction was varied in the same fashion as the previous two values; 
Table 4-27 gives their respective weights (original weights in bold): 
Table 4-27: Weights as Reaction is varied from 0.000 to 1.000 
Value Weight 




0.667 0.600 0.571 0.533 0.467 0.400 0.333 0.267 0.200 0.133 0.067 0.000 
Detection 0.333 0.300 0.286 0.267 0.233 0.200 0.167 0.133 0.100 0.067 0.033 0.000 
The sensitivity analysis follows this procedure for all values within a hierarchical tier. 
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4.7.1 Information Assurance Sensitivity 
AFT AC Experts originally gave Information and IS Protection a local weight of 
4/7, or about 0.571. With this weight, Cisco Secure IDS was clearly the highest ranked 
strategy, receiving an IA score of 0.910. Figure 4-20 shows how the alternatives rank 
when the local weight for Information and IS Protection is varied between 0.0 and 1.0 in 
increment of 0.1. The vertical line shows the original local weight. 
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Figure 4-20: Information and IS Protection Sensitivity Analysis 
Figure 4-20 shows that as Information and IS Protection's weight varies from 0.0 
to 1.0, Cisco Secure IDS remains the highest ranked strategy for IA. The separation at an 
Information and IS Protection weight of 1.0 implies that Cisco Secure IDS scored 
extremely well in relation to this value. 
Detection, which originally received a local weight of 2/7, or approximately 
0.286, was also varied between 0.0 and 1.0 in increments of 0.1. Figure 4-21 presents the 
sensitivity analysis for Detection: 
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Figure 4-21: Detection Sensitivity Analysis 
Again, Cisco Secure IDS is the highest ranked alternative across the entire weight 
spectrum. It is interesting to note that as Detection nears a local weight of 1.0, all other 
alternatives converge to the same overall IA score. This would imply that they all scored 
very similar in Detection measures. 
Figure 4-22 shows the sensitivity analysis for Reaction, which originally received 
a local weight of 1/7, or about 0.143. 
110 
















-»- Baseline Case 
ISS Worst Case 
-x- ESM Worst Case 
-*— Cisco Secure IDS Worst 
Case 
Reaction Weight 
Figure 4-22: Reaction Sensitivity Analysis 
Although the overall IA score for Cisco Secure IDS decreases as its local weight 
approaches 1.0, it still remains the highest ranked strategy. It is important to note that the 
difference between Cisco Secure IDS and ISS becomes very small if Reaction is 
weighted 1.0. Clearly, the ranking of these three alternatives is insensitive to the 
weighting of the IA hierarchy. At the top level of the IA hierarchy, the highest ranked 
strategy with the original weights, Cisco Secure IDS, remains the highest ranked strategy 
regardless of any Information and IS Protection, Detection, or Reaction weight. 
4.7.2   Operational Capability Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis on the top tier values in the IOC hierarchy was performed to 
determine if and where alternative changed rank order due to changing weights. Recall 
that Efficiency, Functionality, Convenience, Ease of Implementation, and Flexibility 
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compose the top tier of the IOC model. The sensitivity analysis for Efficiency, which 
was originally weighted as 5/20.25 (about 0.247) is given in Figure 4-23: 
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Figure 4-23: Efficiency Sensitivity Analysis 
The Baseline Case, the current AMIS configuration, remains the highest ranked 
alternative in the IOC hierarchy until Efficiency receives a weight of 1.0, where it then 
meets with Cisco Secure IDS. Notice the rapid decline of the ISS strategy, implying that 
it scored low in Efficiency and as Efficiency becomes more important, the strategy does 
quite poorly. 
AFTAC experts originally weighted Functionality at 8/20.25, or 0.395. The 
sensitivity analysis for Functionality is shown in Figure 4-24: 
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Functionality Sensitivity Analysis (Most Likely Case) 
Baseline Case 
Internet Security Scanner (ISS) Most 
Likely Case 
Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) 
Most Likely Case 
Cisco Secure IDS Most Likely Case 
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Functionality Weight 
Figure 4-24: Functionality Sensitivity Analysis 
The Baseline Case is the highest ranked alternative until Functionality reaches a weight 
of 0.9, where it then converges with ISS and ESM. The Cisco Secure IDS was the 
second best alternative when Functionality was weighted below 0.2, but was overtaken 
by ESM afterwards and eventually became the lowest ranked strategy. 
Convenience originally received a weight of 5/20.25, or approximately 0.247. 
Figure 4-25 displays the sensitivity analysis for Convenience as it varied form a weight of 
0.0 to 1.0: 
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Convenience Sensitivity Analysis (Most Likely Case) 
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Figure 4-25: Convenience Sensitivity Analysis 
All strategies remain close to each other throughout the weight spectrum, converging 
tightly when Convenience is weighted a 1.0. The Baseline Case does remain the highest 
ranked alternative throughout. 
Ease of Implementation Sensitivity Analysis (Most Likely Case) 
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Figure 4-26: Ease of Implementation Sensitivity Analysis 
Figure 4-26 presents the sensitivity analysis for Ease of Implementation, which 
originally received a weight of 1/20.25, or 0.049. The Baseline Case remains the best in 
Ease of Implementation, which makes intuitive sense since it is already implemented. 
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Therefore, as the weight for Ease of Implementation approaches 1.0, it separates itself 
even further from the rest of the strategies. Depending on the exact weight of Ease of 
Implementation, the rank order of ISS, ESM, and Cisco Secure IDS switch, with each 
being the second, third or fourth ranked alternative. From a weight of 0.0-0.2, ESM and 
Cisco are ranked ahead of ISS. At 0.2, Cisco's score decreases faster than ESM's, 
leaving ESM the highest ranked strategy until it converges with ISS at 0.7. 
Flexibility originally received a weight of 1.25/20.25 (about 0.062) in the IOC 
hierarchy. Figure 4-27 shows the sensitivity for Flexibility as its weight is varied from 
0.0 to 1.0: 
Flexibility Sensitivity Analysis 
(Most Likely Case) 
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Figure 4-27: Flexibility Sensitivity Analysis 
Every strategy received a perfect score for Flexibility since all were determined to be 
Upgradeable and Expandable. Therefore, if Flexibility were to have a weight of 1.0, all 
alternatives would receive a perfect IOC score, which is exactly what Figure 4-27 
illustrates. 
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4.7.3 Impact of IA on Resource Costs Sensitivity Analysis 
The IRC hierarchy had two values in its top tier: Life Cycle Acquisition Costs and 
Personnel. As with the other hierarchies, each of these was varied between 0.0 and 1.0 in 
increments of 0.1 in order to determine if any alternative rankings change depending on 
their respective weights. Again, recall that this analysis can be performed at any tier of 
the hierarchy. 
Figure 4-28 displays the sensitivity analysis for Life Cycle Acquisition Costs, 
which was originally weighted as 0.4: 
Life Cycle Acquisition Costs Sensitivity Analysis 
(Most Likely Case) 
.Baseline Case 
Internet Security Scanner 
(ISS) Most Likely Case 
-*_Enterprise Security Manager 
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Likely Case 
0     0.1    0.2    0.3    0.4    0.5    0.6    0.7   0.8    0.9      1 
Life Cycle Acquisition Costs Weight 
Figure 4-28: Life Cycle Acquisition Costs Sensitivity Analysis 
Since all alternatives are relatively inexpensive to AFTAC, the strategies are insensitive. 
The Baseline Case is the least expensive and is slightly better than the other three 
alternatives throughout the hierarchy. An alternative that was very expensive to install 
and maintain would have had a much flatter slope on the graph than the current 
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alternatives. The reason that the slope is so steep in Figure 4-28 is due to the weaker 
performance of all the alternatives in Personnel. 
AFTAC experts weighted Personnel at 0.6 since they determined it was somewhat 
more valuable than dollar cost. Figure 4-29 shows the sensitivity analysis for Personnel: 
Personnel Sensitivity Analysis 
(Most Likely Case) 
1 
<u   0.8 - 
°    0 6- 
«_ V 
W   04 '' >.f o 
*   02 - - 
""■^ o 
!                      1                     1 




Scanner (ISS) Most 
Likely Case 
_*_ Enterprise Security 
Manager (ESM) Most 
Likely Case 
X   Cisco Secure IDS Most 
Likely Case 
Figure 4-29: Personnel Sensitivity Analysis 
Again, all strategies scored approximately the same, which produces little sensitivity to 
weighting. The steep negative slope for each alternative shows that all scored equally 
low in 'Personnel.' When its weight approaches 1.0, meaning it is the sole measure for 
the IRC hierarchy, the value produced to AFTAC is minimal. 
Given the small number of alternatives analyzed, it is not surprising that they 
were relatively insensitive to the weighting, especially in the IA and IRC hierarchies. 
The IOC hierarchy had five top tier values, with very different original weights, and 
therefore was more sensitive to major weight changes than the IA or IRD hierarchy. As 
was stated earlier, this weight insensitivity occurred throughout the hierarchy. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
The Information Assurance Analysis Model, developed in cooperation with 
experts from the Air Force Technical Applications Center, was used to analyze the 
current level of IA and the impact three different alternatives could have on an 
operational system. The alternatives were analyzed as the Most Likely Case, the Worst 
Case, and the Best Case since AFTAC personnel were asked to make predictions on their 
performance and could not give an accurate point estimate for some measures. A 
sensitivity analysis was then conducted to show how the alternatives would have ranked 
had personnel weighted values differently. This illustrative analysis demonstrates the 
type of insight that the decision-makers at AFTAC can gain when utilizing the IAAM to 
evaluate information assurance alternatives. A robust set of measures and analyses were 
presented to demonstrate the range of support that can be provided to the decision-maker. 
IAAM cannot only calibrate the current level of information assurance, it can also aid in 
the analysis of IA alternatives. 
Chapter 5 is a summary of the project and will discuss such topics as lessons 
learned, opportunities for future work, and general impressions drawn from the project. 
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5. Project Conclusions 
The objective of this thesis project was to provide a Department of Defense 
organization with a quantitative tool to measure and improve their level of information 
assurance. The Information Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM), composed of the 
Information Assurance (IA), Impact of IA on System Operational Capability (IOC), and 
Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC) value hierarchies, was created in order to meet the 
stated objective. Built in cooperation with AFT AC information assurance and 
information systems experts, the IAAM represents information assurance needs both 
specific to AFTAC (represented in the hierarchy weights), and to the DoD as a whole 
(represented in hierarchy values). The model provides decision-makers with the insight 
to aid in making the difficult and complex decisions regarding the delicate balance 
between information assurance, system operational capability, and resource costs. 
5.1 Summary of Previous Chapters 
The first Chapter of this thesis discussed the beginnings of the Internet and the 
inherent risks associated with it. The freedom of open communication afforded by the 
Internet revolutionized the speed in which decision-makers could gather, process, and 
disseminate information. However, the Internet was not originally designed to serve the 
world's population and security problems arose almost immediately after its creation. 
Today, the United States and its military depend heavily on interconnected information 
systems for their everyday operations and therefore need to insure the information 
contained is protected. Information assurance is critical to the safety and well being of 
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America, for one well planned and executed attack on a sensitive U. S. information 
system could cause catastrophic results. 
A literature review detailing the Department of Defense's (DoD) position on 
information assurance was presented in the beginning of Chapter 2 to illustrate the 
importance it plays in today's military environment. Literature detailing civilian sector 
IA concerns was also discussed to show that information assurance must be a community 
wide effort. Although both the military and civilian sectors pronounced the need for 
solid information assurance strategies, to date there have been few attempts to measure it 
available in the public literature. It was then determined that Value Focused Thinking 
(VFT) provided a solid theoretical framework for the problem of measuring information 
assurance. Chapter 2 concluded with a review of the earlier efforts to model information 
assurance with VFT, none of which had been operationally tested. This thesis built upon 
the knowledge of DoD doctrine, information assurance literature, and past IA models to 
develop, in cooperation with the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), an 
operational Information Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM) that would be tested on their 
AFTAC Mission Information System (AMIS). 
Working with information assurance experts at AFTAC, it was verified that the 
IAAM should contain three separate hierarchies: Information Assurance, the Impact of 
Information Assurance on System Operational Capability, and the Impact of Information 
Assurance on Resource Costs. The development of these three hierarchies using the VFT 
process, which included creating values and their associated measures and weights, was 
reviewed in Chapter 3 and presented in detail in the Appendix. The contributions of 
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AFT AC personnel above and beyond their required duty allowed this project to become a 
reality. They cannot be given enough thanks for their time and effort. 
AFTAC personnel proposed three separate information assurance strategies that 
they were considering for implementation into AMIS. These alternatives, along with the 
current AMIS system, were analyzed using the model. The result of this study, along 
with a sensitivity analysis on the value weights, is presented as Chapter 4. 
The Appendix is a detailed review of the hierarchies, to include value definitions 
and rationale, as well as measure functions. Additionally, a Microsoft Excel © 
spreadsheet tool was created to help analyze the model and its results. The spreadsheet 
has the ability to insert and delete measures as deemed necessary to accommodate 
evolving assurance requirements and needs. 
5.2 Project Objectives 
As stated, the goal of this thesis was to provide a model that could be used by 
military or civilian organizations to help improve their information assurance. However, 
the model must be focused to capture specific necessities of the organization using it. 
Therefore, the IAAM was created with the intention that it could be used by a variety of 
organizations by building in the capability to be fined-tuned to fit each specific 
organization's unique needs. 
Ultimately, the IAAM should be able to be used without VFT expert assistance; 
nevertheless, if the model is used incorrectly, it could lead to mistakes and thus the 
utmost care should be made when using the model to make decisions. The IAAM as it 
currently exists should therefore be used in cooperation with a VFT expert. It should be 
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noted, however, the AFT AC personnel who participated in the model development 
exhibited a great deal of understanding of VFT as the project progressed. 
The IAAM met the project objectives for both the AFIT and the AFTAC focus. 
Senior leadership at AFTAC have expressed an interest in implementing the IAAM into 
their information assurance decision-making process. 
5.3 Future Research 
Information assurance will remain a problem as long as people desire another's 
information. Therefore, this work must continue to evolve with computer technology it is 
designed to protect. While the values for this model are likely to remain for a period of 
time, it is unlikely that any assurance model that remains static will remain effective. 
Technology evolves quickly; what is great today will only be good tomorrow, and what is 
good today may be useless tomorrow. The IAAM model was designed to be an 
operational information analysis tool. Emphasis was placed on creating a model that 
would provide insight to decision-makers. Future research should therefore continue to 
focus on improving the insight gained from using this tool. 
It would be advantageous to apply this model to other systems at AFTAC that are 
of a higher classification to see which adjustments might be required. Again, this model 
does not necessarily have to remain in its present form to be beneficial to an organization. 
Weighting does provide the flexibility to re-focus the model. However, if a uniquely 
different system does require adjustments beyond mere re-weighting, the existing 
hierarchies and measures provide a starting framework for future efforts. 
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This model did try to capture some uncertainty by analyzing the Most Likely, 
Worst, and Best Case conditions for the alternatives. However, a probabilistic risk 
assessment was not incorporated beyond the Best and Worst Case conditions mentioned. 
Utility theory accounts for decision-maker risk tolerance by assessing the probability of 
different events occurring, and if used properly will provide the decision-maker with a 
tool specifically tailored to that person's preferences. The incorporation of risk is clearly 
an additional possibility. 
As personnel become more familiar with the IAAM and its uses, it can be utilized 
in conjunction with other analysis techniques. A further extension might be constructing 
an optimization to select the correct portfolios maximizing the fundamental value score. 
A linear program used in conjunction with VFT principles would combine the two 
techniques to provide a model with even greater precision. For example, personnel could 
use VFT to generate value hierarchies representing what was important the organization's 
information assurance as was done in this thesis. The linear program would then 
multiply the value coefficient by the alternative's score, producing an overall information 
assurance total. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The Information Assurance Analysis Model is one step towards solving the 
information assurance dilemma. Decision-makers will continue to struggle to achieve a 
balance between information assurance, system operational capability, and resource 
costs. The work presented in this thesis provides organizations with a quantitative tool to 
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help find the balance between these competing values in order to improve their mission 
effectiveness. 
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Appendix. Value Hierarchies and Associated Measure Functions 
The objective of this project was to develop a model to measure and improve 
Information Assurance (I A) at AFT AC using the process of Value Focused Thinking 
(VFT). The system chosen for study was the AFT AC Mission Information System 
(AMIS). AMIS carries a SECRET classification, therefore it stores and processes 
valuable information that requires protection. Joint Doctrine defines Information 
Assurance to be: 
Information Operations (10) that protect and defend information systems 
(IS) by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, 
and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information 
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities 
[JP 3-13, 1998:1-9]. 
Improving IA may impact the System Operational Capability (IOC) and AFTAC 
Resource Costs (IRC); consequently these considerations must also be included in the 
model. Figure A-l shows the relationship between IA, IOC, and IRC. A best case 
scenario would be one that increases information assurance, positively impacts system 





























Figure A-l: Relationship between Information Assurance (IA), Impact of IA on System Operational 
Capability (IOC), and Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC) [modified from Hamill, 2000: 4-2] 
In order to capture the three key factors, the Information Assurance Analysis 
Model (IAAM) has been constructed as shown in Figure A-2. There are three main 
hierarchies in the model: Information Assurance (IA), Impact of IA on System 
Operational Capability (IOC), and Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC). 
Information Assurance Analysis 
Model (IAAM) 
^A-""""^                          i r                                ^"""""--A. 
Information Assurance 
(IA) 
Impact of IA on System 
Operational Capability (IOC) 
Impact of IA on Resource 
Costs (IRC) 
Figure A-2: The Information Assurance Analysis Model 
The three hierarchies are used to find a balance between these competing factors in 
order to provide the best balance of assurance and system capability at the lowest cost. 
The current level of IA at AFT AC was baselined in order to provide a frame of reference 
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for this study. This allowed value gaps, defined to be areas where improvement can be 
gained, to be identified on AMIS. Several different IA strategies were then proposed, 
scored, and rank ordered using the model. Combined, this information provided valuable 
insight that AFTAC decision-makers can use to determine which IA strategies should be 
selected for implementation. 
The Information Assurance (IA) hierarchy is first discussed, followed by the Impact 
of IA on System Operational Capability (IOC) hierarchy, and finally the Impact of IA on 
Resource Costs (IRC) hierarchy. The IA hierarchy contains values associated with 
measuring what AFTAC personnel determined to be important regarding the information 
assurance on AMIS. The IOC hierarchy measures the change in operational capability an 
IA strategy is projected to have upon the system, not the actual system operational 
capability. Likewise, the IRC hierarchy measures the impact an IA strategy will have on 
AFTAC resource costs, and is not a measure of AFTAC s overall resources. 
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Information Assurance 
The first step in the VFT process is to identify what values system experts feel are 
important to each of the three hierarchies. Beginning with the IA hierarchy, a definition 
of each value, the rationale behind it, and an explanation of the single dimensional value 
functions used to measure the value will be presented. The full IA hierarchy is shown as 
Figure A-3: 
Information Assurance 



























Figure A-3: Information Assurance (IA) Value Hierarchy 
The IA hierarchy is separated into three main sub-hierarchies: Information and 
Information Systems (IS) Protection, Detection, and Reaction. These values were taken 
from the JP 3-13 definition of IA given on the first page of this document. When 
presented to AFTAC information assurance specialists, they concurred that an IA value 
hierarchy must capture all the elements of protection, detection, and reaction in order to 
be a complete model. It is important to note that information assurance is not a synonym 
for computer security; IA is the entire process of defending valuable information. 
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Information and Information Systems (IS) Protection will be discussed first 
followed by Detection and Reaction. The value hierarchy is a representation of AFT AC 
values and should not to be read as a flow chart. Like an organizational chart, the 
ordering of the values at any given level is not significant. The hierarchy could read 
Reaction, Detection, and Protection from left to right and not disturb the model. The 
weights placed on each value, which are discussed in Chapter 3, signify the importance of 
that particular value. 
Information and Information Systems (IS) Protection 
Information Assurance 
(IA) 
Information and IS Protection 







Figure A-4: Information and Information Systems (IS) Protection 
Information and Information Systems (IS) Protection; Measures taken to protect 
information and information systems. An event is defined as any abnormal activity that 
occurs to the system that could compromise information. Malicious attacks by terrorists 
or an AFT AC employee accidentally accessing restricted information are both considered 
events. 
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Rationale: Protection is a key consideration of any IA strategy. It includes both 
electronic protection, physical security measures, and policies that prevent unauthorized 
personnel from accessing information. Protection is critical because it is responsible for 
preventing events before they ever occur; it is impossible for a foe to corrupt information 
if unauthorized access cannot be attained. It is important to note that protection, in this 
hierarchy, includes both information and information systems; therefore protection 
against both electronic and physical attacks are considered. 
Information and IS Protection is a very broad term requiring further definition. 
Using both joint doctrine and AFT AC experts, Information and IS Protection was 
separated into Availability, Confidentiality, Integrity, and Compliance. The discussion 
begins with the uppermost value in the hierarchy and progresses downward until all 
values are covered; this pattern is followed throughout the appendix. Recall that the 
position of a value within any individual tier does not reflect its level of importance. 
Availability: The system is available to authorized 
personnel when needed. 
Rationale: Availability is important because 
authorized users and system administrators must be 
able to utilize the system in order to perform their 
missions. Availability is a product of good 
protection; a properly protected system will be 
available to authorized personnel when they need it. 
% Of System Uptime (E-mail) 
% Of System Uptime (Print) 
% Of System Uptime (File) 
% Of System Uptime (Internet) 
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Measure: Availability is measured as the percentage of system uptime for both users and 
support personnel. Since the system may perform more than one function, and these 
functions may be available independently from one another (for example, e-mail may be 
available when the print server is not) there are separate measures for each critical system 
function. AMIS, the system under study, has four primary services (e-mail, print, file, 
and Internet); therefore there are four separate value functions. Each service was 
weighted separately, reflecting the different levels of importance between the services. 
Taken independently, AFTAC values each of the services in the same pattern, so the 
shape of the value function is constant for all four system functions. The graphs in 
Figure A-5 through Figure A-8 show that no value is given until the servers are available 
for at least 80% of the time. Anything below this 80% Availability point is unacceptable 
to the organization. There is a sharp rise in value from 90% to 95% availability because 
the agency feels that anything less than 95% availability would severely hamper mission 
capabilities. 
Figure A-5: Percentage of System Uptime (E-mail) 
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Figure A-6: Percentage of System Uptime (Print) 
Figure A-7: Percentage of System Uptime (File) 
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Figure A-8 Percentage of System Uptime (Internet) 
Confidentiality: Unauthorized people do not have 
access to restricted information. 
Rationale: While Availability considers if system 
functions are operational, Confidentiality captures 
whether or not the user is authorized to access the 
information. It is important that unauthorized people 
do not gain access to information they should not 
have. A system that was available 99% of the time 
to anyone with Internet access would score high in Availability, but it would have no 
confidentiality. Confidentiality considers both insider access and outsider access. For 
example, a user with a secret classification should not be able to access a top-secret 
information system; Confidentiality, as measured here, is therefore independent of who is 
trying to gain unauthorized access to restricted information. 
Compliance 
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Measure: Confidentiality is measured by determining what change an IA strategy will 
have on existing confidentiality. This is done for two reasons: only known 
confidentiality breaches can be measured (if a breach in confidentiality occurs and is not 
detected then there is no way of measuring it), and system Confidentiality is not a 
vulnerability that an organization would necessarily want to disclose. Additionally, 
confidentiality is rarely constant across a time period. Usually several events will occur 
that jeopardize confidentiality within a very short time period, which is then followed by 
a period where no events occur. This is due, in part, to the fact that a particular system 
vulnerability can be exploited until it is fixed, allowing several events to occur in a short 
time period. Once fixed, the system is secure again until a new vulnerability is found and 
exploited. Figure A-9 shows that an IA strategy resulting in No Change to 
Confidentiality receives a value of 0.5. The categories are linear on either side of No 
Change since AFT AC values a gain in confidentiality as much as they dislike a loss in 
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Figure A-9: Change in Confidentiality Resulting from an IA Strategy 
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Integrity; Protection from unauthorized change. 
Rationale: Information in the system must be 
dependable. It is important that the data in the system 
be correct in the sense that it is what the originator 
intended. Integrity addresses the concept that 
information stored in a database Monday will be the 
same when accessed on Wednesday. The reasons 
information could become corrupted are varied; however, whether intentional or 
unintentional, system integrity must protect against the entire array of possibilities. 
Measure: Like Confidentiality, Integrity is also measured as a change from the existing 
system. Figure A-10 shows that any decrease to current system integrity causes that 
particular IA strategy to receive a severe value penalty on this measure. Any strategy that 
either does not affect integrity or increases integrity will score relatively high compared 
to those that decrease system integrity. The graph therefore shows that a decrease to 
system integrity has a greater value loss than the gain in value for an increase in system 
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Change in System Integrity Resulting from an IA Strategy 
Figure A-10: Change in System Integrity from an IA Strategy 
Compliance: Measures taken to protect against 
known vulnerabilities 
Rationale; It is advantageous to an organization to 
know exactly what security measures have been 
taken to combat known vulnerabilities. Air Force 
mandated security programs and policies, such as 
virus software and AFCERT patches, should be 
updated regularly to assure the system remains 
current in its security procedures. It is the duty and 
responsibility of each agency to comply with Air Force regulations. 
Measure: Compliance is measured with two separate functions: the percentage of 
automated compliance procedures and the percentage of validated compliance. 
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Percentage of Automated Compliance Procedures: 
This measure captures the ability of the system to 
automatically update and install compliance 
programs. Automated compliance procedures are 
advantageous to an organization because they do not 
require support personnel involvement. This allows 
procedures to be installed immediately and correctly, 
in addition to allowing support personnel the ability to 
concentrate their efforts in other important matters. 
The function is linear because it was determined that there is equal value gained for every 
percentage increase in automated compliance procedures. 
Compliance 
% Automated Compliance 
Procedures 
Figure A-ll: Percentage of Automated Compliance Procedures 
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Information and IS Protection 
: Availability 
iConfidentiality 
Percentage of Validated Compliance: It is important 
to know exactly what percentage of compliance 
procedures an organization has installed. Failure to 
install these procedures could lead to an unnecessary 
information compromise. This measure is shaped as 
an S-curve with a sharp upward trend at 75% because 
AFTAC experts feel that a system with less than this 
percentage of validated compliance provides little 
value to system protection. At 90% the curve flattens, 
meaning that increasing the percentage of validated compliance above this level results in 
smaller marginal value gains to system protection. 
Automated Compliance 
Procedures 
% Validated Compliance 
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Figure A-12: Percentage of Validated Compliance 
The next sub-hierarchy under Information Assurance is Detection. Figure A-13 
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Figure A-13: Detection 
Detection: The ability of the system or system personnel to detect an event. Again, an 
event is any abnormal activity or action that could compromise the system or information 
contained within the system. 
Rationale: The system's ability to quickly and accurately detect an event is valued 
because an event cannot be stopped unless it is first detected. Detection is further 
decomposed into Timely, Accountability, and Flexibility. Detection can occur from 
either system personnel or the system itself. Detection capabilities must also have the 
ability to be increased or decreased depending on the INFOCON situation (reference 



















Figure A-14: Timely 
Timely: The amount of time it takes to detect an event. The amount of time is measured 
from the actual start of the event (which may or may not be immediately known) to the 
point of detection. 
Rationale: If an event can continue undetected for an extended period of time (extended 
being relative to the system and the type of event), then that event has a greater 
opportunity to cause harm than an event that was detected immediately. Since different 
events may take a different amount of time to detect or pose a different type of threat, 
Timely was separated into Physical Internal, Electronic Internal, Physical External, and 
Electronic External. An internal event is any event caused by a person authorized to use 
or work around sensitive information. An intrusion by a janitor who steals information 
while cleaning after hours would therefore be classified as an internal event since he was 
authorized to be around valuable information, although he would not have been approved 
to access it. An authorized user is a person who is trusted to view, edit, or otherwise 
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example, does not necessarily mean that person is authorized to use a system in the 
facility. An external event is any event caused by personnel outside of the AFATC 
organization that harms the system or system information. Again, an event does not have 
to be malicious; a construction crew that is working outside the AFTAC building and 
accidentally cuts an AFTAC phone line would be classified as an external event. 
Physical events are situations where physical property is damaged, while electronic 
events are strictly performed through computer 
networks. 
Physical Internal: A physical disruption of the 
information or IS by a person within the organization. 
This could be either accidental (spilling coffee on a 
keyboard causing the system to short) or intentional 
(breaking the lobby keypad to obtain access to a 
restricted area). 
Rationale: Measures must be taken to prevent 
internal physical events, whether intentional or 
accidental, that could result in a compromise of information. Whether the event was 
malicious or not is irrelevant for this measure; it must be detected in a timely fashion so 
that proper action may be taken. 
Measure: The time to detect physical internal events is measured in eight-hour working 
days since, in the vast majority of instances for AMIS, the event is not malicious and 
valuable information is not lost or stolen. There is a steep drop after five working days 






internal event. There is still some value in detecting the event prior to ten working days, 
but the curve flattens out rapidly. At twenty workdays (one work month), AFT AC 
personnel feel that more than sufficient time had passed since the event actually occurred, 
and detecting it beyond this point, while necessary, does not score any value. 
Figure A-15: Time to Detect a Physical Internal Event, measured in eight-hour workdays 
Electronic Internal: An electronic event 
originated from an internal source, whether 
intentional (purposely trying to login to a system 
above the user's classification) or unintentional 
(accidentally accessing a restricted site) that 












Rationale; A tremendous amount of information can be compromised, lost, or stolen 
depending on the type of electronic event that may occur. It is therefore necessary to 
detect these types of events as quickly as possible. 
Measure: Since Electronic Internal events originate from a "friendly source," who are 
assumed to be responsible and dedicated employees, this value is measured in eight-hour 
workdays. Air Force personnel are trusted to make the right decisions regarding sensitive 
information, and therefore they are not continuously monitored. However, since the 
opportunity exists to lose sensitive information quickly, electronic internal events must be 
detected more rapidly than physical internal events. There is a fairly steep curve from 
immediate detection to one day since there is great value in the ability to detect this type 
of event as close to the time that it occurred as possible. The curve flattens after one day 
but up until a week (5 days is one workweek) because there is still high value in detecting 
an event rapidly. After one week, the curve is essentially linear meaning that each day is 
as important as the next, scoring nothing at 10 or more workdays. 
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Physical External: Any physical event affecting the information or IS by an outside 
individual. 
Rationale: An external physical event is defined as any 
event originating from persons outside the AFT AC 
organization that harms AFTAC property. It is 
irrelevant, in terms of the measure of detection, if the 
event was malicious in nature or not. A construction 
crew who accidentally cut the phone line outside the 
building or a group posing as a construction crew who 
maliciously destroyed the line both cause the same 
initial damage and therefore requires the same timely 
detection. 
Measure: The time to detect a physical external event is measured in hours due to the 
fact that any event originating from an outside source is deemed to be of much higher 
potential threat than an event originating within AFTAC. A physical event could cause 
any number of problems for AFTAC, ranging from loss of communication to damaged 
computers, or even damage to personnel in the most extreme cases. It is therefore 
necessary to detect these types of events as close to their actual occurrence as possible. 
The graph illustrates this point by showing that approximately half the value is lost after 
only one hour, three quarters of the value is lost at two hours, and no value at all is earned 
if the system or system personnel cannot detect the event within one work day (eight 
hours). 







Figure A-17: Time to Detect Physical External Event, measured in hours 
Electronic External: An electronic event originating 
from an external source that could compromise 
information, harm the system, or be otherwise disruptive 
to the mission. 
Rationale: Any attempt to gain access, destroy, or 
otherwise compromise the system from an outside source 
must be detected as quickly as possible to eliminate the 
possibility of an attacker gaining valuable information or, 
worse, going unnoticed. Electronic external events are 
the most dangerous events from an information assurance 
point of view because they are hard to detect, they are often malicious attempts to 
damage or steal AFT AC information, and they can happen very rapidly. 
Electronic Internal 
Electronic External 





Measure; Electronic external events are measured in minutes because of the extreme 
threat they pose to a system. Like physical external events, there is a tremendous loss in 
value if the event cannot be detected immediately; after only 10 minutes the system will 
receive a score of 0.5 and by the one-hour point less than a score of 0.1 is assigned. If the 
system cannot detect an electronic external event within two hours, then it is seen as 
totally unacceptable and gains no value. 

















Figure A-19: Accountability 
Accountability: The ability of the system to detect and correctly classify events. 
Rationale: Accountability is composed of two sublevels that are classified separately 
because they carry different levels of importance. An event must first be detected as an 
event and then categorized properly. Failure to do either of these could result in an event 
(1) going unnoticed, or (2) thinking an event was one 
type of activity when in reality it was another and 
thus resulting in an improper reaction. A system 
cannot be fully accountable if it does not perform 
both of these values proficiently. 
Ability to Detect an Event: The ability of the system 
or system personnel to determine if an event occurred. 
Rationale: An event must first be detected in order to 







compromised, and who was responsible. If the event is not detected then valuable 
information may be compromised for an indefinite period of time. 
Measure; Since the detection rate (percentage of events detected) is impossible to 
calculate (the system and system personnel may never know of events they did not 
detect), the assumption is made that a fully automated detection system will be more 
effective than a fully manual detection system. For example, a system that has the ability 
to automatically detect unauthorized user intrusions is more valuable than one that 
requires support personnel to periodically check log files for abnormalities. The graph 
shows that a system with 100% automated detection capabilities receives a score of 1.0, 
and a system relying completely on human detection (0% automated detection 
capabilities) will receive a 0.0. It is assumed that a system with 25% automated detection 
capabilities has 75% manual detection capabilities. The fractions represent the 
percentage of total time spent on detecting events; therefore 50% automated and 50% 
manual would mean that machines and personnel would spend the same amount of time 
detecting events. The line between the two endpoints is slightly convex showing that 
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Figure A-20: Ability to Detect an Event, measured by Percentage of Automated Detection Capabilities 
Ability to Accurately Categorize an Event: The ability 
of the system or system personnel to categorize an event 
correctly. 
Rationale: If the event was not categorized correctly, 
then reaction to the event may be improper. An over 
reaction (i.e. "pulling the plug") may impact mission 
capability and therefore is extremely undesirable, while 
an under reaction (or perhaps no reaction) may result in 
permanently lost or damaged information, an even worse 
outcome. 
Measure: The identical categories were used for this measure as were used in the Ability 
to Detect an Event measure for the same rationale. Automated systems can categorize 
Electronic External 
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more events in a shorter period of time than humans. For example, a machine can read 
through system logs much faster than a person can, so it would be expected that a 
machine could categorize more errors in the logs than a human could. The shape of the 
curve is similar to that of the Ability to Detect an Event, showing that the jump from 75% 
automated to greater than 75% automation is valued more than any other jump of the 
same distance. 











Flexibility: The ability of the system to increase or 
decrease detection capabilities depending on the situation 
at hand. 
Rationale: It would be advantageous for a system to have 
the capability to increase or decrease its detection 
capabilities based on the current INFOCON level. For 
example, at INFOCON ALPHA, the detection capabilities 
of the system might operate at normal. If the organization 
should then go to INFOCON BRAVO, it would be 
beneficial to have the ability to adjust detection capabilities 
in order to reach higher detection fidelity. This would allow the system and system 
personnel to detect more events in a high threat environment than it would in a low threat 
environment. 
Measure: This measure is a simple yes / no because the system either has the capability 
to increase or decrease detection capabilities or it does not. An inflexible system would 
be a system that could only be on or off, whereas a flexible system would have the ability 
to turn certain functions on or off, or change the level of detection at which certain 
services function. For example, a system that could shut down e-mail while keeping the 
print server active would be a flexible system. A system which could be set to stop more 
suspicious traffic according to INFOCON levels would be valued. At a low threat level, 
the number of false positives could be kept low. In a higher threat setting, requiring 
greater vigilance, the system would regularly have a higher false positive level, which is 
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Figure A-23: Reaction 
Reaction: Measures taken to (1) appropriately respond to an identified attack and (2) 
restore the information and IS capabilities to an acceptable state, their original state, or an 
improved state. Reaction also includes the ability to learn from previous events so that 
the likelihood of future damage is reduced or eliminated for that type of event. 
Rationale: The third step in assuring information is to properly react to an event. If there 
is no action taken once an event has occurred, then the event could continue indefinitely. 
Reaction involves three separate values: the ability to Respond to the event, Restore the 
information, and Adapt to the new situation. Again, the Reaction sub-hierarchy is not 
meant to be a timeline; Respond, Restore, and React are values that were developed 
based on joint doctrine and the opinion of AFT AC personnel because they are considered 
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Figure A-24: Respond 
Respond: The ability to take proper action after an event is detected 
Rationale: Once an event is detected, failure to take proper action could allow the event 
to continue, cause other events to occur, or possibly ruin a chance to prosecute an 
attacker. It should be noted that AFTAC is not authorized to launch any offensive 
actions; however they must report the incident to a higher authority who may then take 
appropriate action, as they deem necessary. AFTAC does have a responsibility to take 
defensive actions to assure its information and information systems. In addition, they 
also have a responsibility to collect appropriate information during an event to aid 
AFTAC and others in taking authorized steps in response to the event. Respond is 
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Adapt / Learn 
Timely; The time needed to notify appropriate 
personnel after detecting an event, identifying 
the event source, and then taking the proper 
action against the event. 
Rationale: It is essential to know exactly who 
is responsible for an event and what damage 
the event caused. Notifying system personnel 
and identifying the parties involved in a timely 
fashion makes personnel aware that a certain 
group or individual may be trying to access 
unauthorized information. 
Measure: The time it takes to correctly respond to an event. This measure is broken into 
three separate parts: Time to Notify Support Personnel, Time to Identify the Event, and 
the Time Needed to Take Appropriate Action. 
Time to Notify Support Personnel: The time it takes 
from the discovery of an event until support personnel 
can be notified. The most desired occurrence is that 
the proper support personnel are instantaneously and 
directly notified; for instance proper personnel are 
immediately paged as soon as the system detects an 
event. The next best category is that they are 
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being that support personnel receive an e-mail alert at the same time the system detects 
an event. The final three categories are notification by support personnel (they discover 
the event and are therefore notified upon discovery), a user detecting the event (not 
valued as much since the user must then notify the support personnel), and finally the 
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Figure A-25: Time to Notify Support Personnel 
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Time to Correctly Identify an Event: Measured 
from the time support personnel have been 
notified until the time they correctly determine the 
nature of the event. Any correct identification 
after two hours, while necessary, is deemed too 
slow to be valued. 
0.5 1 1.5 
Time to Correctly Identify an Event (hours) 
Figure A-26: Time to Correctly Identify an Event, measured in hours 
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Time to Take Appropriate Action: Measured from the 
time the event was correctly identified until the situation 
is under control of system personnel (control implies 
either stopping the event, containing the event, or 
intentionally prolonging the event to gather evidence). If 
the time to take proper action is sixty minutes or more, a 
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Flexible Deterrence: Taking appropriate action at the 
appropriate time. 
Rationale: Almost any event can be stopped by 
completely shutting down the system. However, this 
may not always be the best course of action since (1) 
essential missions will be impacted, and (2) it may 
prevent the collection of evidence necessary for future 
prosecution. The ability to have graceful degradation, 
where the system can be taken down in steps rather 
than all at once, is therefore necessary to take proper action. 
Measure: This measure is separated into categories that classify the system's ability to 
be shut down at different levels. The preferred outcome is a system that will disconnect 
from the network only at the source of an event, causing minimal disruption to the rest of 
the system and its users. The worst case is that during any event, the entire system must 
be shut down. High value is still gained if the event can be isolated at the service level, 
for instance the system administrators can shut down the print service if an event is 
detected within that server. Very low value is given if the entire server must be taken 
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Figure A-28: Flexible Deterrence: Point at which an System can be Isolated during Event 
Verify: The ability of the system or system 
administrators to determine, after the event, if their 
actions, which include detecting, classifying, and 
gathering evidence from an event, were appropriate. 
Rationale: Decisions must be made quickly during 
an event. After the event is over, it is therefore 
necessary to determine if the decisions made were 
the correct decisions. For instance, after responding 
to an attack, the system administrators would like to 
have the ability to go back to system logs and see if enough information about the event 
was retained. If, after careful review, it was thought that a better action could have been 
taken, a different course of action or procedure may be necessary if a similar event 
occurred in the future. 
id Personnel Detect, 
Identify, and Act 
Properly? 
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Measure: After further review of the response process, did AFT AC personnel identify, 
categorize, and act properly given the nature of the event. The measure is a binary Yes or 
No, with Yes receiving a value of 1.0 and No receiving a value of 0.0. There is no 
middle value in Verify because it was felt that when the organization reflects upon its 
actions, they either detected the event, categorized it, and reacted to it correctly or they 
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Adapt / Learn 
Figure A-30: Restore 
Restore: The ability to restore information or an information system to an acceptable 
level after an event. 
Rationale: Information must be restored to an acceptable state after an event. Both time 
and accuracy are considered when determining if the restoration was successful. The 
idea of graceful restoration, where systems can be brought back step by step instead of in 
an all or nothing fashion, is key in determining the 
restoration capabilities of a system. 
Timely: The amount of time needed to recover and 
restore information to an acceptable level. 
Rationale: Failure to restore information in a 
timely manner could result in permanently lost 
information, prolonged vulnerability, or decreased 
mission capability. 
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Measure: Amount of time needed to restore mission capabilities. This measure is 
separated into two parts: the amount of time to restore full infrastructure and the amount 
of time to restore data. The amount of time to restore full infrastructure is measured in 
hours, and the amount of time to restore data is measured in days, as it often takes much 
longer. In addition, some missions can be accomplished when the infrastructure is 
restored but not all databases have been restored and verified as accurate. 
Time to Restore Full Infrastructure: The amount of 
time needed to fully restore the system to its original         
capability. The faster full infrastructure can be 
restored the more valued it is to the organization. The 
curve is steeper from 0 to 2 hours because of the 
importance of restoring the system in under two hours. 
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Figure A-31: Amount of time to restore full infrastructure, measured in hours 
Time to Restore Data: The amount of time needed to retrieve and restore lost or 
damaged data to the system. This process often takes a 
longer period of time then infrastructure restoration 
since it involves the process of determining what data 
was lost, finding the last instant when the data was not 
corrupt, and restoring the system with the uncorrupted 
data. 
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Figure A-32: Time to Restore Data, measured in days 
Accurately: The information restored must be 
correct. 
Rationale: Restoration of incorrect information is not 
acceptable and therefore has no value to the unit. 
Measure: The percent of data accurately recovered. 
Again, inaccurate recovered data has no value, so 
only the percent of correct data recovered is 
considered. No value is given unless at least 20% of 
the lost data can be recovered. The curve rises 
gradually to 80% and then becomes steeper because 
there is little value to the unit if they cannot recover 
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Figure A-33: Percentage of Data Accurately Recovered 
Adapt / Learn: The ability of the system or system 
users to learn from an event and adapt to the new 
situations resulting from the event. 
Rationale; Learning from mistakes or events and 
taking corrective action prevents the same errors from 
occurring multiple times. 
Measure: This measure was separated into two parts: 
the ability of support personnel to teach the system, and 
the ability of the system to teach itself. The reason for 
the separation is that it is beneficial to allow personnel 
to manipulate system algorithms when necessary. The 
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itself. When the two functions are combined, the best possible case is a system that will 
166 
adapt automatically, but will allow an administrator to teach it different procedures when 
needed. The worst case is a system that is completely unchangeable, meaning that it does 
not learn from past vulnerabilities and cannot be programmed to deal with them in the 
future. Each separate function must be weighted to determine if the ability of support 
personnel to teach the system is more important than the ability of the system to teach 
itself, or vice versa. 
Cannot be Taught Partially Taught Fully Taught 
Ability of Support Personnel to Teach System 
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Figure A-35: Ability of System to Teach Itself 
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Impact of IA on System Operational Capability 
Changes to information assurance are likely to impact system operational 
capability and therefore they must be considered in the study. The complete Impact of IA 
to System OC hierarchy is shown in Figure A-36. 
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Figure A-36: Impact of Information Assurance on System Operational Capability 
Impact of IA on System Capability: The amount of system operational capability (OC) 
gained or lost due to implementing a new IA strategy. 
Rationale: Changing the system to improve IA will almost certainly have some impact 
on the system's operational capability. It is therefore necessary to consider OC when 
determining what, if any, IA course of action should be implemented. A strategy that 
greatly increases IA may severely reduce system operational capability and therefore may 
not be the best alternative when all factors are considered. The most desired goal is to 
improve IA and positively impact the system's operational capability, if possible. 
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Efficiency 
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Figure A-37: Efficiency 
Efficiency: The system can perform the required tasks quickly and consistently with 
respect to demand on the system. 
Rationale: Implementing an IA strategy may impact the speed of the system, which 
would force it to be able to process a different amount of information per time period. 
This value is broken down into the Ability to Process Users and the Impact on System 
Overhead. 
Efficiency 
Ability to Process Users 
Change in User Throughput 
Impact on System Overhead 
Ability to Process Users: The impact an IA strategy 
will have on the system speed and usage with respect 
to the system users (not support personnel). 
Rationale: If the system is slower because of a new 
IA strategy, then the users may experience slower 
service when trying to access information. This may cause the mission to suffer since 
users cannot perform their jobs at the same speed as before. Likewise, an increase in user 
service due to an IA strategy will allow users to do their missions faster and perhaps more 
effectively. 
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Like many measures in the Impact of IA to System OC hierarchy, this measure 
focuses on the change the IA strategy will have on OC. In this case, No Change is valued 
greater than 0.5 because most IA strategies actually decrease OC. When a strategy does 
not materially adversely impact the system OC, then it will usually receive a fairly high 
value. 
Measure; The Ability to Process Users is measured by the Change in User Throughput to 
the system. User Throughput is defined to be the speed at which the system allows the 
user to work. For this measure, increasing user throughput at all will gain a value of 
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Figure A-38: Ability to Process Users, measured as the Change in User Throughput 
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Efficiency 
Ability to Process Users 
Impact on System Overhead 
Change in System Capacity 
Impact on System Overhead: The percent capacity of the system an IA strategy 
requires. 
Rationale: The less an IA strategy negatively 
impacts system capacity the better the strategy will 
be (all other things being equal). A system running 
at 80% capacity will be less effective then a system 
running at 50% capacity assuming both can do all jobs equally. Increasing a two-lane 
highway into a four-lane highway will increase the capacity of the road, thereby making 
its ability to process automobiles more efficient (more cars can now use the highway then 
before). Likewise, an IA strategy that allows more information to be processed will 
increase the system capacity, and therefore the system operational capability. 
Measure: Impact on System Overhead is measured by the change in system capacity due 
to an IA strategy. Again, no change to the current system is seen as a good alternative, 
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Figure A-39: The Impact on System Overhead, measured as the Change in System Capacity 
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Functionality 
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Figure A-40: Functionality 
Functionality: The usefulness offered to system clients by providing information and 
information related capabilities (both desired and essential) 
Rationale: A change is the system usefulness (in relation to the mission or the users) will 
affect system functionality. For example, if a new IA strategy allows the system to 
perform a new function, then the overall usefulness of the system increased. Likewise, if 
a strategy now forces the system to be down 50% or more of the time than it used to be, 
the system has lost functionality because its users cannot access the system. This value 
was separated into Missions Enabled, Availability, and Compatibility. 
Missions Enabled: Did the new IA strategy 
allow the system to perform any new missions or 
functions? 
Rationale: It was determined through discussion 
that no IA strategy that removed a mission would 
ever be considered for implementation on the 
Functionality 
Missions Enabled 
' •/-—GidStrategy Enable a New     ~N 




target system. Therefore only the ability to add new missions or functions to an existing 
system will be considered. 
Measure: The measure is simply determining if the new IA strategy enabled the system 
to perform more missions or functions than it previously could. 





hange in System Availability 
Compatibility 
Availability: The change in downtime due to an 
IA strategy. 
Rationale: A system that is down too much will 
decrease mission performance. If an IA strategy 
causes the system to be down five times a week 
(compared to say three times before the new 
strategy), then the system has lost availability and thus functionality. 
Measure: The Change in System Availability is used to measure how the new IA 
strategy affects previous system availability. Availability is crucial to mission 
accomplishment, thus No Change scores a 0.9. Figure A-41 shows that while increasing 
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Figure A-41: Availability, measured as the Change in System Availability due to 
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Compatibility; The ability of the information 
system to interact with other systems, hardware, and 
software. 
Rationale: Increasing or decreasing the amount of 
systems that are compatible with the current 
configuration could impact the usefulness of the 
information system. It was determined through 
discussion that an IA strategy that was truly incompatible would never be considered for 
implementation. 
Measure: The Degree of Difficulty in Making a New IA Strategy Compatible is used to 
measure how well an IA strategy interacts with other systems. AFTAC experts agreed 
that almost any IA strategy can be made compatible; however some take a considerable 
amount of effort and some do not. The categories range from complex, where system 
experts spend many days working the strategy into the existing system, to strategies that 
involve no difficulty whatsoever, such as changing a software package from version 2.0 
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Figure A-42: Compatibility, measured as the Difficulty in Making New IA strategies 
Compatible with existing system configurations 
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Convenience 














Figure A-43: Convenience 
Convenience: The level of complexity needed to operate the system 
Rationale: Changing the difficulty in using the system could impact how well the user is 
able to process information, thereby affecting system operational capabilities. A user is 
likely to avoid very inconvenient systems if the mission can be accomplished elsewhere 
or it is non-essential. The system exists to serve the users, minimize their difficulty, and 
provide secure, assured access to important information. Since Convenience captures the 
ability to access the system, and once in the system, the ability to use it, Convenience is 
separated into Accessibility and Complexity. 
Accessibility: The change in system accessibility 
faced by the user due to an IA strategy. 
Rationale: Changing the user's ability to gain 
access to the system could cause the user to waste 
valuable mission time just trying to logon to the 
system. Likewise, a user may be able to gain access more quickly due to an IA strategy, 
such as using a smart card. 
Convenience 
Accessibility 




Measure: Accessibility is measured by the Change in System Accessibility. This graph 
contains more categories than previous graphs because of the sensitivity of system 
accessibility; very small changes can have a large impact on the ability of a person to use 
the system. A score of No Change gains the strategy a score of 0.5, meaning that this is a 
neutral position. The magnitude of value difference on either side of No Change is the 
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Figure A-44: Accessibility, measured as the Change in System Accessibility 
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Complexity 
Impact of IA on System 
Operational Capability 
(IOC) 






Figure A-45: Complexity 
Complexity: The level of difficulty in using the system, both for users and support 
personnel. 
Rationale: The longer it takes to train and become proficient in a system, the less time 
that person has for performing their mission. Since this differs for users and support 
personnel, they are treated separately. AFTAC support personnel feel that the systems 
are there to help the users perform the mission, and support personnel must ensure the 
systems are useable. Therefore it was deemed by support personnel in the study that it 
was far better to have a system that is easy for users to work, yet difficult for support 
personnel to maintain, than it would be if the 
situation were reversed. Convenience 
Users: The complexity of training and using the 




Change in System 
Complexity for Users 
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■ Support Personnel 
Measure; Again, this value is measured relative to the original system. Not changing the 
degree of difficulty in using the system scores a 0.5. Making a system more complex to 
the users will cause a loss in value while making it less complex for users results in a gain 
in value. 
Significant Moderate     Minimal No Minimal     Moderate Significant 
Increase    Increase     Increase     Change    Decrease  Decrease   Decrease 
Change in System Complexity for Users 





Support Personnel: Complexity of training 
and using the system for support personnel. 
Support personnel are defined as any person 
responsible for system upkeep. 
Measure: This value is measured using the 
same categories that were used for the Degree 
in Change in User Complexity. However, 
from the graph it is apparent that support personnel do not score as great a loss in value 
score for increasing complexity as the user graph did. As mentioned above, this is due to 
Support Personnel 
\j> Change in SysterriN. 
^^    Complexity for Support   ) 
^--^_     Personnel _^^-^ 
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the fact that support personnel are willing to use a complex system themselves in order to 
prevent users from working on a more complex system. Support personnel do value the 
ability of an IA strategy to decrease complexity. The No Change category actually scores 
higher in this graph (0.6) than it did in the previous graph (0.5) because the support 
personnel in the study feel that there is better than average value to any strategy that does 
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Figure A-47: Support Personnel Complexity, measured as the Change in 
System Complexity for Support Personnel 
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Ease of Implementation 






Functionality Convenience Ease of Implementation Flexibility 




Ease of Implementation 
Figure A-48: Ease of Implementation 
Ease of Implementation; The degree of difficulty associated with installing a new IA 
strategy 
Rationale; An IA strategy that is very difficult to implement may impact system OC due 
to time, training, and testing. Ease of Implementation was separated into the Time to 
Implement and Test and Usage history. 
Time to Implement and Test; The time 
needed to implement and test an IA strategy. 
Rationale: It is important to implement and 
test an IA strategy in a timely fashion. 
Measure: This value is separated into three 
categories: the time it takes to implement 
software strategies, hardware strategies, and 
physical strategies. This separation was used because of the relative time to implement is 
valued differently for each type of strategy. For example, if what is believed to be a 
simple software upgrade ends up taking all day to install, then it would receive no value. 
Time to Implement and Test 
Usage History 
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Ease of Implementation 
However, a physical information assurance measure that can be implemented in less than 
one workday would receive a score of almost 1.0. 
Software: The Time to Implement and Test 
Software strategies is measured in hours 
since these types of installations usually 
occur within one workday. The graph shows 
that there is a significant value drop after 
three hours. After four hours, the curve 
becomes even steeper, and anything over six 
Time to Implement and Test 
Usage History 
hours is seen as a significant burden and receives no value. 
1 *-4 
0.8 
o   °6 
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n 
>    0.4 
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12 3 4 5 
Time to Im plement a Software IA Strategy (hours) 
Figure A-49: Time to Implement and Test a Software IA Strategy, measured in hours 
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Hardware: Hardware implementations typically 
take longer to accomplish than software 
installations, thus it is measured in workdays. 
Very high value is given for installations that 
take less than half a day. After a half-day, the 
curve is steep to one-day implementation time. 
Ease of Implementation 
Time to Implement and Test 
Usage History 
After one day, the curve is somewhat linear with a few minor slope adjustments until it 
reaches the value endpoint of six workdays. 
Figure A-50: Time to Implement and Test a Hardware IA Strategy, measured in workdays 
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Ease of Implementation 
Time to Implement and Test 
Physical: Physical IA strategies tend to take 
even longer than hardware implementations, and 
therefore physical implementations are 
measured in workweeks. If the task can be 
accomplished in under a week then at least 80% 
of the value will be earned. Tasking taking four 
weeks (about one months' time) or more receive 
no value for this measure. Many physical strategies inconvenience users and support 
personnel due to construction, crowded office space, deliveries, and so forth. Therefore 
the value drop from week to week increases until the third work week, where almost all 
value is lost. 
Usage History 
Figure A-51: Time to Implement and Test a Physical IA Strategy, measured in workweeks 
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Ease of Implementation 
1 ime to Implement and Test 
Usage History 
Usage History: The track record of a hardware or 
software IA strategy; i.e. how the product fared in 
the past, particularly on similar systems. 
Rationale: It was considered better to use 
hardware or software that has been proven to be 
operationally effective compared to items that are absolutely brand new and may have 
errors that might not yet have been discovered. There is some trade-off between using 
state of the art but untested products and highly reliable products that have been 
previously tested. 
Measure: This measure was separated into two parts: the history of the strategy across 
industry and the unit personnel's experience with that strategy. While a strategy might be 
common practice in industry, if no one in the office had ever used it before then it might 
not be the best alternative for the organization. On the other hand, if a strategy is not the 
industry standard but AFTAC personnel have a depth of experience with it, the strategy 
would be favored in the second measure although not the first. Industry usage and unit 
experience are both valued. 
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Industry History: This measure is capturing how 
well the product has fared in similar situations 
over time. An industry standard is a product that 
is widely used and widely accepted by similar 
organizations and / or information systems. This 
also means that help is readily available from 
outside sources should AFTAC need it. No Exposure means that the strategy is unique to 
the organization; there is no one else outside the organization that uses or has used the 
product. 
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Figure A-52: Product Usage History, measured as the Amount of Exposure 
the Product has Seen in Similar Industries 
189 
Personnel Experience: A product's usefulness is 
limited if personnel at the organization have 
limited experience or would require numerous 
hours of training in order to be proficient with the 
product. Therefore, all other things being equal, 
an organization would want strategies for which 
its people already have expertise using. These categories are organization wide, and not 
necessarily the level of expertise of the highest individual. Therefore it would depend on 
the organization and specific strategy being considered to determine the overall personnel 
expertise. One person within the organization who is experienced in a strategy is better 
than none, but it is preferred to have wide experience throughout the organization. 
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Figure A-53: Personnel Usage History, measured as the Amount of 
Experience Personnel have with the Product 
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Flexibility 
Impact of IA on System 
Operational Capability 
(IOC) 







Figure A-54: Flexibility 
Flexibility: The ability of the system to change over time as technology evolves. 
Rationale: It is important that systems can be upgraded or expanded when new 
technology becomes available or the opportunity to improve the system exists. This 
value category is separated into Upgradeability and Expandability. 
Upgradeability: The ability of the system to 
allow software or hardware upgrades. An 
upgrade involves enhancing an old product with 
a technologically superior one. 
Rationale: Upgrades to the hardware or software 
due to an IA strategy may improve system performance, thereby increasing OC. It is 
important to note the difference between upgradeable and replaceable; almost any system 
can be entirely replaced once a superior one is available. An upgradeable system is one 
where components of the system may be changed without having to replace the entire 
system. For example, installing a new operating system, which also has better protection 
for office personal computers, would be considered a software upgrade. 
' /^   Can System beN 
vv.^_ Upgraded? ' 
Expandability 
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Measure: After much discussion, it was determined that a strategy is either upgradeable 
or not, and that there is no degree to upgradeability. If a system is upgradeable, then IA 
experts begin to ask other questions such as whether or not it is compatible, easy to use, 
and so forth. System expertise will be a key consideration in the scoring of this measure. 
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Figure A-55: Upgradeability, measured as whether or not the system can be upgraded 
Expandability: The ability of the system to 
accept additional components. The difference 
between expandability and upgradeability is that 
expandability considers only adding similar 
components to a system architecture. 
Rationale: A system that has the ability to expand can become more powerful without 
too much disruption to the system. For example, a system configuration which allows 
new hard drives to be easily added is more valuable then a system that needs to be 
completely re-configured to install the drives. 
' f     Can System be""^ 
^—__ Expanded? ' 
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Measure; Like Upgradeability, Expandability is a binary category. A system or strategy 
is either expandable or it is not. Again, if the system is expandable, other qualities may 
















Is the System Expandable? 
Figure A-56: Expandability, measured as whether or not the system can be expanded 
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Impact of IA on Resource Costs 
The final sub-hierarchy, the Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC), is shown in 
Figure A-57: 
I 











Time       Number 
1 
Figure A-57: Impact of Information Assurance on Resource Costs 
Impact of IA on Resource Costs: The impact an IA strategy will have on both 
workforce and fiscal costs. 
Rationale: All other things being equal, the system that consumes the least amount of 
AFT AC resources will be the more desired system. 
Life Cycle Acquisition Costs: The fiscal cost of 
an IA strategy. 
Rationale: Budget constraints and monetary 
resources force cost to be a consideration when 
determining an IA strategy. 
Measure: There are two separate costs to consider when dealing with an IA strategy: the 
initial cost to purchase the product, and the maintenance costs it will consume over a 
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period of time. Initial costs were separated into computer systems and physical systems 
since they are treated differently by Air Force regulations. 
Initial Computer System Cost: Air Force 
regulations require that any computer system 
Initial Computer 
System Cost 
purchase over $ 100,000 must be approved by |—^""waiPhyäcaT 
Construction Cos. 
the Air Force. Therefore, any purchase under Average gecurrihg Costs, 
$100,000 receives a very high value since it can be executed within AFTAC. In addition, 
purchases under $100,000 can be done more rapidly than larger purchases due to the 
approval process. Once the $100,000 threshold is crossed, there is a severe drop in value. 
Any computer system strategy that requires an initial investment of over $1 million 
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Figure A-58: Initial Life Cycle Acquisition Cost for a Computer System, measured in millions of dollars 
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Initial Physical Construction Cost: The curve 
for initial dollar cost for physical construction is 
Life Cycle Acquisition Costs 
—(     Initial Computer 
System Cost, 
shaped the same as it is for computer systems, |—^"v^\ pnysicaT 
Construction Cos 
although the dollar breakpoints are different. 
1 f       Average 
"*'" secHfUgil§§|sj 
Air Force regulations state that any physical construction under $500,000 does not need 
to be authorized outside the agency; however once that point is crossed Air Force 
authorization is required. Such authorization requires more time to attain and is thus less 
valuable to AFT AC. Therefore, if a physical IA strategy can be accomplished for under 
$500,000, it will receive high value score (over 0.9). Any physical construction over $5 
million will receive no value. 
Figure A-59: Initial Life Cycle Acquisition Cost for Physical Construction, measured in millions of dollars 
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Average Recurring Costs: Regardless of the 
type of strategy, recurring costs are considered 
Initial Computer 
equally. This graph shows that every dollar is |—/^\n,tta\ Physical 
Average 
Jecurring Costs considered to be as valuable as the next, 
resulting in a linear relationship from $0 to $200,000. Every dollar that can be saved is 
valuable to AFTAC. After $200,000/yr, no value is earned on this measure. 
re 
> 
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200000 
Figure A-60: Recurring Cost of an IA strategy, measured as the Normalized Unit Annual Cost per Year 
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Personnel 















Figure A-61: Personnel 
Personnel: The workforce cost of an IA strategy. 
Rationale: Implementing an IA strategy may impact the ability of people to perform the 
mission. Since users and support personnel have separate costs associated with them 
(user time learning IA is considered different then support personnel time because it takes 
away the user from the actual mission), they are treated separately in the hierarchy. 
User: The amount of user time needed to learn an 
User 
' -/^urne Needed to   ""N 
^^JTrain Users^_^s 
Support Personnel 
IA Strategy Personnel 
Rationale: The more time a user spends training as 
a result of a new IA strategy, the less time they will 
have to perform their primary mission 
Measure: User training time is measured in hours because user time is highly valued. 
Taking people away from their primary job in order to train them in IA means that they 
are not performing their mission during this time. Ideally, all user training should be 
accomplished within a half-hour. After an hour there is a severe value drop. After four 
hours, no value is scored. 
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Initial Time Needed tf> 
Train Support 
Personnel 
Support Personnel; The amount of added 
training and people needed to support an IA 
strategy, broken down further into time and 
number. 
Time: The amount of time needed to train 
support personnel in an IA strategy. 
Rationale: Support personnel will not be able 
to perform their mission while they are actively 
training in an IA strategy. 
Measure: The Time Needed to Train Support Personnel is composed of the initial 






Initial Time Needed to Train Support 
Personnel: Initial training is considered to be 
the initial exposure ofthat person to the new 
strategy. Since the support personnel need to 
be experts in the strategy, several workdays 
training is not uncommon. There is a steep 
drop in value after four workdays, however, 
because this is the point at which the training 
has severely taken the administrator away from 
their primary mission. Lengthy Temporary Duty (TDY) assignments are therefore not 
desirable. There is another drop after five workdays. After twenty workdays, or about 
one months' time in training, there is no value to be gained. Every time support 
personnel must attend training, they force the rest of the organization to function without 
them. When they are gone for long blocks of time, this can cause a heavy burden on the 
remaining personnel and users. 
Initial Time Needed To"» 
Train Support 
Personnel 
Frequency of Support^ 
IfPgrsonnel Training. 





Figure A-63: Time Needed to Initially Train Support Personnel in an IA strategy, measured in workdays 
Recurring: The degree of training that 
support personnel must attend per IA strategy 
over the course of the year. It is composed of 




'Initial Time Needed! 
Train Support 
Personnel^, 
Frequency of SupporT" 
^Personnel Training 
Time per Training"" 
Session    __ 
Number 
(frequency), and how long the training lasts 
per session. 
Frequency: How often the training occurs 
over the course of the year. 
Measure: This value is measured by how 
often support personnel are taken away from regular duties to train in an IA strategy. 
Both Daily and Weekly score a 0.0 since this is considered to be too much of a burden on 
the person and the unit. A strategy that requires recurring training once per year or less 
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Figure A-64: Frequency of Training Needed for Support Personnel 
Time per Training Session: Independent of 
the frequency of training is the time per training 
session. Each day is considered valuable, 
supporting a steep drop off after every full day. 
Recurring training that lasts over three 
workdays receives a score of 0.0. Recall that 
this is measuring recurring training in strategies 
that personnel are already considered to be ■—HH 
Time 
Initial Time Needed tö"*- 
Train Support 
Personnel^ 
^Frequency of Support"" 
Personnel Training 









Figure A-65: Time Needed per Training Period for Support Personnel, measured in workdays 
Number; The change, either positive or 
negative, in the number of people needed to 
perform an IA strategy. 
Rationale: All things being equal, an IA 
strategy that requires one support person will be 
a better strategy than one that requires two. It is 
unlikely that an organization will be able to 
request personnel be moved (either into or out of the organization) depending on their 
current IA situation; however, it is possible that some support personnel will have the 
ability to perform other duties should an IA strategy free up some of their time. 
Measure; This value is measured as the Percent Change in the Number of Support 
Personnel required after a new IA strategy. This graph is very sensitive to change, since 
a loss or gain of 10% is a considerable amount of people. The graph exhibits a steeper 
% Increase or Decreased 
Support Personnel Needed 
for IA 
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value change for adding personnel than for freeing up personnel. As previously 
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Figure A-66: Percent Change in Support Personnel Needed due to implementing a new IA strategy 
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